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Macet Total: 
Logics of C irculation and 
Accumulation in the Demise of 
Indonesia's New Order
The streets of today's Jakarta are not meant for pedestrians. The commuters in their
automobiles and the pedestrians live in two separate worlds___ Walking on the streets
means that one has no access to a car, no access to a protective network, and no access 
to anybody anywhere. What such people carry with them is all they have. Jakartans in 
their passing cars, on the other hand, incessantly run around the city, back and forth, 
round and round, busily tracing the mentally constructed route-maps and reenacting 
ties organized hierarchically into the network.
1. Introduction: A Nation of One-Way Streets
For a visitor to a major Indonesian city like Surabaya in the final years of the 
Suharto era, the pattern of vehicular traffic made for a strikingly odd contrast with big 
boomtowns elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In this city of nearly four million residents,
1 The author would like to thank Joshua Barker, Arief Djati, Lotta Hedman, and Benny Subianto for their 
encouragment, insight, and inspiration from the conception of this essay to its eventual completion, as 
well as Ben Anderson, Anne Booth, Howard Dick, Vedi Hadiz, Douglas Kammen, Mike MaUey, Jonathan 
Pincus, Loren Ryter, and Takashi Shiraishi for their comments, suggestions, and constructive criticisms 
on /of an earlier draft. Financial support for research in Indonesia was provided by the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London, and the South East Asia Committee of the British Academy. 
Responsibility for errors of fact and judgment rests solely with the author.
2 Saya S. Shiraishi, Young Heroes: The Indonesian Family in Politics (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 
1997), pp. 27,30.
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Indonesia's second largest metropolis and industrial hub, the number of stop-lights 
and four-way intersections could virtually be counted on one hand. Almost always 
uni-directional in terms of traffic, the main boulevards of Surabaya were rarely 
unilinear. Instead, even major arteries of the city tended to snake around the four 
points of the compass, forking or fading smoothly into other thoroughfares with 
hardly a ripple in die remarkably steady stream of one-way traffic.
Indeed, the effect was to minimize the frequency and length of traffic jams— 
kemacetan or simply macet—and to maximize the ease and fluidity of traffic circulation. 
Frequent local newspaper articles in the 1980s and early 1990s attested to the assiduous 
efforts of the Surabaya city government to this end, rerouting traffic in new directions, 
on new streets, to meet the ever rising flow of auto vehicles in the metropolis. One-way 
streets, it seemed, were the key: as a bemo (public minibus) driver explained to the 
author in the autumn of 1997, Indonesian drivers could hardly be trusted to handle 
two-way streets without creating a mess. Transportation routes might often seem 
excessively circuitous, with pedestrians condemned to rare overpasses and mad 
dashes across busy boulevards, but the traffic rarely came to a complete standstill.
Thus when traffic did grind to a halt, when macet occurred, there was always a 
palpable sense of interest in the source of the problem, heads popping out of car 
windows, raised eyebrows and shared nervous glances among passengers in the bemo. 
On such occasions it was easy to grasp what John Pemberton described in his nuanced 
account of die 1982 election campaign in the city of Solo: the omen of "an approaching 
sa'at, a moment when something might happen. . .  a sense that carried with it all the 
fascination of an enormous political traffic accident."3
Perhaps, as Pemberton's comments suggested, the pattern of traffic in late-New 
Order cities like Surabaya reflected deeper patterns in the workings—and the 
unravelling—of the Suharto regime. Indeed, Suharto's success in consolidating power 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s owed much to the massive reinfusion of foreign 
capital into the circuitries of the Indonesian economy and the rapid recirculation of 
rival military officers within the corridors of the Indonesian state. Suharto's durability 
in the 1980s and 1990s, moreover, likewise rested to a considerable extent on the 
continued mutasi and regenerasi of the Armed Forces officer corps and, with the end of 
the oil boom, the accelerated inward flows of foreign direct investment and outward 
flows of manufactured goods. Like the painted mannequin policemen standing 
watchfully at key road junctions in Surabaya to oversee die traffic, Suharto presided 
over the continuous flow of capital, labor, and commodities, and the regular rotation of 
military and civilian personnel. It was precisely this steady circulation (sirkulasi)—of 
bank loans, oil drums, export containers, high school and university graduates, 
parliamentarians, bupatis, and Army officers—along one-way streets that kept 
Indonesia in motion as Suharto stood still, for more than thirty years.
Yet the costs and the limits of such sirkulasi were apparent to all who could sense 
the possibility of macet. After all, the constant refashioning of Surabaya's thoroughfares 
had engendered countless local neighborhood protests in the city, and throughout 
Indonesia, the inroads of New Order state and capital had left bitter resentments in 
their wake. The forced removal of becak (pedicab) drivers from main Jakarta streets in
3 John Pemberton, On the Subject of "Java" (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 6.
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the 1980s, the unceremonious dumping of hundreds of becak in the harbor, and the 
ensuing public outcry perhaps best exemplified this trend.
Suharto, moreover, was no mere mannequin traffic cop. As his centrality and 
durability depended very heavily on the continued circulation of personnel and 
constant flow of resources, logjams in capital accumulation or regime reproduction 
were all the more meaningful, and all the more threatening, in their implications. 
Hence the great salience in New Order history of key peristiwa (incidents)—the Malari 
riots of January 1974, the Tanjung Priok massacre in 1984, the storming of the Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) headquarters in 1996—or even seemingly minor episodes, 
termed interupsi, in the regime's pseudo-parliamentary bodies, such as a military 
delegate's outburst against vice-presidential nominee Sudharmono in the MPR 
(People's Consultative Assembly) in 1988. Yet like any real traffic cop, Suharto could 
use die threat and reality of logjams to his own purposes, both to clear traffic violators 
from the streets and to reaffirm the rules of circulation and the authority of their 
enforcers.
Seen in this light, the exact moment that signalled the unravelling of the Suharto 
regime may be pinpointed with great precision: the evening of May 4, 1998. With the 
announcement that government subsidies on fuel prices would be drastically reduced 
at midnight, thousands of automobile and motorbike drivers around the country lined 
up at gasoline stations to buy up remaining supplies of subsidized fuel. In Jakarta and 
Surabaya, at least, the lines for fuel extended many city blocks, bringing traffic at key 
junctions to a virtual standstill: macet total.
Late that night, scores of bemo and taxi drivers in downtown Surabaya converged 
on the regional assembly (DPRD, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) building to 
demand the restoration of fuel subsidies, and, over the following week, student 
protests previously confined to the university campuses spilled out into the streets for 
the very first time in 1998. In the three weeks after the traffic jams on the streets of 
Jakarta and Surabaya, the nation witnessed mass protests and looting in Medan, 
violent riots in Jakarta and Solo, a student occupation of the Parliament, and the 
resignation of President Suharto. In short, the "enormous political traffic accident" that 
Pemberton foretold.
A focus on the May 4, 1998 traffic jams, moreover, highlights certain lingering 
puzzles about the New Order's demise. President Suharto, it should be recalled, had 
weathered previous economic crises by bending with the winds, bowing to the 
demands of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and other foreign lenders and 
investors, and opening up new avenues to ease and accelerate the flow of sirkulasiA Yet 
in late 1997 and early 1998, the regime showed a striking preference for a very different 
approach to macet management: VIP parking and restricted entry in key arteries, 
staged disruptions and diversions of traffic on main boulevards, and forced removal of 
traffic violators from the streets. Even the decision to slash fuel subsidies (and its 
timing) in early May stemmed not from the specific requirements of an IMF austerity 
program but from these stubbornly diversionary, disruptive tactics, which, ironically, 4
4 Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996).
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helped to facilitate a surprisingly fluid and orderly process of transition to a post- 
Suharto era.
The remainder of this essay aims to explain such oddities and ironies in the demise 
of the New Order in terms of the logics of sirkulasi and macet in the workings of the 
Suharto regime. On the one hand, this essay argues, it was the underlying tension 
between circulation and accumulation in Suharto's New Order which set die stage for 
the macet total of May 1998. On the other hand, the essay suggests, the regime's own 
tactics for managing macet helped to shape the process and outcome of regime 
transition. By tracing die logics of sirkulasi and macet, this essay seeks to illuminate the 
final months of the Suharto era, drawing on die abundant treasures of scholarship on 
Indonesia's New Order as well as the pedestrian observations of this bystander on the 
streets of Surabaya and Jakarta during die macet total of 1998.
2. Logics of Circulation and Accumulation
As Pemberton argued, the Suharto regime was an essentially hybrid form of 
authoritarian rule, whose internal institutional contradictions provided the essential 
parameters for political continuity and change in Indonesia since the mid-1960s. Many 
observers noted the tensions between the regime's 'traditional Javanese' and 
modernizing tendencies in the ideological realm, its variously integralist and Islamidst 
approaches to ethnic and religious diversity, and its alternately liberal and statist 
leanings in economic policy. Yet the most important tensions within the regime, it can 
be argued, stemmed from the peculiar mix of institutional bases and personal 
networks through which Suharto entrenched himself in power and exerted authority 
over the more than thirty years of his rule. In this regard, one key structural tension 
within the regime developed between the pattern of circulation within the Armed 
Forces and the process of personal accumulation by the President, between the military 
circuitries of his regime and the more civilian networks for his electoral and ideological 
legitimation and his (and his family's) economic enrichment. This tension prefigured 
the macet to come.
As is well known, Suharto came to power in late 1965 in the wake of a coup d'etat, 
and it was his position as commander of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Reserve 
Command, in Jakarta—and as one of the Army's most senior generals—that allowed 
him to consolidate power, both within the Armed Forces and in Indonesian society at 
large. Under Suharto, the Army assumed a dominant role within the Armed Forces, 
the state, and society, and Army officers (both active and retired) came to occupy 
numerous key positions as cabinet ministers, local government officials, heads of state 
enterprises, and members of the regime's pseudo-parliamentary bodies. Institutionally, 
the Armed Forces' preeminent position within the state was guaranteed through its 
appointed representatives in the largely rubber-stamp parliament and the MPR, the 
body that met every five years to "elect" the president and vice-president.5
Over the years, even as Suharto abandoned his Army uniform for civilian attire 
and relinquished his long-held role as Defense Minister to successive (retired) generals,
5 John A. MacDougall, "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy," 
Indonesia 33 (April 1982): 89-121.
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the President retained considerable control over military promotions and assignments. 
However, unlike civilian autocrats such as Ferdinand Marcos in the neighboring 
Philippines, for example, Suharto was acutely aware of the dangers of overstaying 
generals and saw fit to maintain a steady pace of rotation (mutasi) and retirement. 
Every year, officers reaching the ripe age of fifty-five were pensioned off, usually to 
cushy civilian postings. The fruits of this policy were considerable, breeding not a 
generation of restive colonels but rather a steady stream of upwardly mobile and 
amply servile generals.
Yet this pattern of fluid sirkulasi gave rise to three underlying structural problems. 
First of all, three decades of Suharto's rule witnessed a steady erosion of the personal 
loyalty owed by the military leadership to the President himself. With every passing 
year, even as another annual batch of Aimed Forces officers went into retirement at the 
age of fifty-five, Suharto grew older and his links to the officer corps—through shared 
personal, generational, and institutional experiences—grew ever more tenuous. In the 
late 1960s and 1970s, Suharto could still fill the uppermost ranks of the military 
hierarchy with trusted lieutenants from his days as Commander of the Army's 
Diponegoro (Central Java) Division, the Mandala Command for file Liberation of West 
Irian, and Kostrad in the 1950s and early-mid 1960s. By file 1980s, however, virtually 
all such old Army cronies had died off, disgraced themselves, or otherwise exhausted 
their usefulness, and the old pattern could only be prolonged through extraordinary 
reliance on a single long-time prot£g6 from a somewhat later generation, General 
Benny Murdani, who enjoyed unprecedented authority as Suharto's security and 
intelligence czar for much of the decade.6 As Benedict Anderson noted in the pages of 
this journal in 1985: "It is safe now to say that at no previous time in Indonesia's 
history has a military man on active service had such complete control of the country's 
fire power as General Murdani."7
Yet by the 1990s, after Benny Murdani's long postponed but perhaps inevitable 
demise, Suharto found himself reliant upon a military establishment dominated by 
officers who had risen up through the ranks with little direct personal contact with—or 
proven personal loyalty to—their President. To offset the horizontal solidarities and 
shared institutional loyalties inculcated in the military academy in the 1960s and early 
1970s and reinforced over the three decades of ABRI's (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia, The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) institutional entrenchment 
under the New Order, Suharto was forced to resort to the cultivation of new vertical 
dyadic ties with individual officers. Thus the early 1990s found him favoring senior 
officers with previous service, or with close personal relations with members of his 
own family, as his personal adjutants and bodyguards. The former trend was first 
apparent in the rise of former aide-de-camp General Try Sutrisno in the 1980s and his 
installment as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Pangab) in 1988-1993, while 
the latter pattern was pioneered by Suharto's brother-in-law, Army Chief of Staff 
(Kasad) General Wismoyo Arismunandar (1993-95).
6 See David Jenkins, Soeharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modem Indonesia Project Monograph Series No. 64,1984).
7 Ben Anderson, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 40 (October 1985): 136.
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Yet Suharto's strategy was hardly without dangers of its own. The favor shown to 
such well-connected officers earned the President a growing reputation for nepotism 
and engendered the resentment of less privileged (if avowedly more "professional") 
officers in the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, even those officers closest to the Palace had 
invariably established other strong relationships and loyalties over the years—to their 
military academy classmates and their former commanding officers—that competed 
with the fealty they owed to their President and the cluster of interests associated with 
the Palace.8
Secondly, from the early days of his seizure of power in 1965, Suharto had also 
relied on civilian networks and bases of support and on constitutional and pseudo- 
democratic trappings to entrench himself as President and embellish his rule. Student 
activists, political party networks, and parliamentary figures were cultivated in the 
effort to eliminate the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) from the political scene and 
to engineer the dethroning of Soekamo, technocrats were enlisted to facilitate the re­
opening of the Indonesian economy to foreign capital, politicians (and thugs) were 
hired to manufacture electoral victories for Golkar and staff the regime's rubber-stamp 
parliament, businessmen were promoted to oil the political machine and rewire the 
circuitries of the domestic market.
Thus, from the beginning there were tensions between the institutional interests of 
the Army and the personal interests of the President and those who staffed his civilian 
bases of power—in the Palace, the Cabinet, Golkar, and the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat, People's Representative Assembly), state enterprises (e.g. Pertamina) and the 
bureaucracy, and the business world. In the 1970s, Suharto leaned heavily on a circle of 
trusted lieutenants from his Army days in the Soekamo era—the so-called "financial" 
and "political" generals—to run the show, but by the 1980s even many upper echelons 
of "civilian" power had been filled by a less familiar crop of technocrats and retired 
Armed Forces officers recirculating along non-military bureaucratic or parliamentary 
career paths in their late 50s and early 60s. Thus the early 1990s saw Suharto 
reasserting personal control over the upper echelons of Golkar and the bureaucracy 
through the installation of civilian figures close to the Palace. This pattern of favoritism 
in civilian appointments shared many obvious limitations and drawbacks with the 
parallel strategy pursued in managing the Armed Forces leadership.
Thirdly and finally, if year after year saw the rotation and retirement of yet another 
batch of officers, the passing of time witnessed complete stasis in the top national 
leadership as well as the steady accumulation of wealth and power by a small cluster 
of private interests associated with the President. The oil boom years of the 1970s had 
seen the rise of diversified conglomerates owned by close cronies of the President, 
typically ethnic-Chinese financiers or cukong who enjoyed close personal and business 
ties to Suharto for many years, and by the late 1980s men like Liem Sioe Liong and Bob 
Hasan had established a commanding presence in the Indonesian economy through 
privileged access to state loans, tax and regulatory breaks, monopoly privileges, special 
concessions, and countless other perks.9
8 The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1 ,1992-April 3 ,1993," Indonesia 55 
(April 1993): 180.
9 Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 271-322.
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By the early 1990s, moreover, as the President entered his twilight years, the (by 
now middle-aged) Suharto children had through similar methods accumulated 
enormous wealth and amassed vast business empires which spanned all major sectors 
of the economy. As foreign investors and bankers flooded into the country, they 
invariably chose members of the President's family as key partners and borrowers in 
major industrial, infrastructure, and real-estate projects. In short order, the Suharto 
children also installed themselves and their minions in top leadership positions in 
Golkar and, in due course, the Cabinet.10 Unlike their predecessors in these seats of 
power, they were certain to stay so long as Suharto remained President. Their 
emergence and entrenchment spelled new restrictions on sirkulasi and portended the 
onset of macet at the highest levels of New Order authority. Thus, by the 1990s, in 
contrast with all the other old soldiers who faded away in steady numbers with every 
passing year, Suharto stood out as the nation's sole overstaying general, pursuing 
dynastic accumulation rather than regenerasi at the pinnacle of state power. With his 
mortality and the question of presidential succession growing more urgent with every 
passing year, increasing pressures for turnover could be sublimated but never fully 
suppressed.
Thus, by the early 1990s, the competing New Order logics of circulation and 
accumulation had begun to foreshadow the onset of macet. Even as steady mutasi and 
regenerasi proceeded within the Armed Forces and into the civilian corridors of the 
state, stagnation in the national leadership, and accumulation and entrenchment 
(rather than continued circulation) by a cluster of private interests based in the Palace 
threatened to clog up the core arteries of the regime. Yet to understand the form which 
this congestion would assume in the late 1990s, it is necessary first to situate the 
pattern of steady sirkulasi and impending macet in the regime sketched above against 
the backdrop of changes in New Order society.
3. Jaringan: Modal, F£odal, Intel (lektual), Islam
Since the inception of the Suharto era in 1965-1966, social incorporation into the 
regime had proceeded through the admission and circulation of £lite networks or 
jaringan within the key corridors of New Order power. The mode of social 
incorporation varied considerably from one 61ite network to the next, carrying major 
implications for their long-term capacities for circulation and accumulation under the 
New Order. The outer limits and internal contradictions of the regime's policies of 
cooptation and incorporation into the patterns of sirkulasi over the years also 
prefigured the nature of the macet to come.
First and most critically, the Suharto regime established intimate, but narrowly 
economic, linkages with Indonesia's embryonic business class, based not on circulation 
within the state but rather the private accumulation of capital. Dutch colonial policies
10 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 133- 
161.
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had discouraged indigenous entrepreneurship and trade,11 spawned immigrant 
"Chinese" commercial networks,12 and segregated and stigmatized this ethnic 
minority as "foreign,"13 thus creating a post-independence business class which was 
both overwhelmingly ethnic "Chinese" and politically very vulnerable. Playing on 
fears and resentments drummed up in the anti-communist pogroms of 1965-66, the 
Suharto regime exaggerated and demonized ethnic-Chinese links to Beijing and 
imposed draconian social restrictions on the ethnic-Chinese community as a whole.14
Meanwhile, in the business realm, the regime relied heavily on ethnic-Chinese 
pariah entrepreneurs to oil the rusty cogs of the state machinery and domestic market. 
Economic liberalization in the late 1960s and oil boom in the 1970s created 
unprecedented opportunities for capital accumulation under a state-led program of 
(mostly import-substitution) industrialization, with old patterns of Army "parallel 
financing" and business partnerships with ethnic-Chinese cronies persisting at the 
local level and now extrapolated to the national arena as well. Thus, as noted above, 
men like Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan, ethnic-Chinese business partners of Suharto 
since the 1950s, began to construct vast diversified economic empires in the first two 
decades of the New Order, through state bank loans, monopoly franchise concessions, 
and other special government facilities.15 Other well-connected ethnic-Chinese 
konglomerat similarly emerged and thrived through partnerships with key military 
commands and sub-contracting deals with state enterprises.16 As massive flows of 
foreign investment spurred rapid export-oriented industrial growth and urbanization 
in the 1980s and 1990s, "konglomerat lokal" likewise emerged, invariably through 
collusive relationships with local military and civil officials in many cities and towns 
scattered throughout the archipelago.17 Yet their steady advancement was largely 
confined to capital accumulation in only the narrowest sense: New Order policies 
discriminating against the ethnic-Chinese impeded their circulation and ascendancy 
within the military hierarchy, the bureaucracy, or other circuitries of state power.
11 See Jennifer Alexander and Paul Alexander, "Protecting Peasants from Capitalism; The Subordination 
of Javanese Traders by the Colonial State," Comparative Studies in Society and History 33,2 (April 1991): 370- 
394.
12 Onghokham, "Chinese Capitalism in Dutch Java," Southeast Asian Studies 27,2 (September 1989): 156- 
176; James Rush, Opium To Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
13 G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," in Indonesia, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven: Human 
Relations Area Files, 1963), pp. 97-117.
14 Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala Lum pur Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 52- 
68,99-176; M61y G. Tan, "The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese in Indonesian 
Society," Indonesia 1991 (Special Issue on the Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modem  
Indonesian Life): 113-125.
15 See Jamie Mackie, "Towkays and Tycoons: The Chinese in Indonesian Economic Life in the 1920s and 
1980s," Indonesia 1991 (Special Issue on foe Role of foe Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modem Indonesian 
life): 83-% .
16 See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 273- 
303.
17 See Benny Subianto, "Portret Konglomerat Lokal," in Huru-Hara Rengasdengklok (Jakarta: Institut Studi 
Arus Informasi, 1997), pp. 89-108.
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Secondly, the regime also incorporated remnants of the local aristocracies which 
had supported the colonial state under the Dutch and survived and prospered in the 
post-independence era as the conservative backbone of Soekarno's PNI (Partai 
Nasionalis Indonesia) in many parts of the archipelago. In Java and Madura in the late 
1960s and through much of die 1970s, the priyayi still retained numerous bupatiships 
and, at least in die case of Mohammad Noer, the governor's seat in East Java.18 The 
role of the Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta during this early period—first 
in the Cabinet and later as Suharto's Vice-President—symbolized the apogee of this 
trend. In the Outer Islands, a similar pattern prevailed, with Golkar typically built 
upon the bases of local aristocratic privilege and patronage networks previously 
sheltered beneath the umbrella of Soekarno's PNI. Yet by the late 1970s, the 
centralizing tendencies of the regime, as well as the overabundance of retiring military 
officers to fill bupatiships, provincial governor's seats, and national-level bureaucratic 
posts, spelled the limits of local aristocratic entrenchment, ascendancy, and 
accumulation in the New Order.19 Indeed, as with "Chinese" business networks, the 
Suharto regime imposed a definite ceiling on the accumulation of social and political 
capital through private family networks, with only one obvious major exception.
Thirdly, and by way of contrast, the Suharto regime provided ample opportunities 
for the entrenchment and advancement, through state and para-statal circuitries, of 
Indonesia's small, urban, Westernized intelligentsia and professional classes, which, 
due to colonial legacies, were disproportionately Christian in their faith and 
educational background. Early Portuguese influences in eastern Indonesia and later 
Dutch missionary efforts throughout the archipelago had created sizeable pockets of 
Catholics and Protestants, and together with the largely non-Muslim ethnic-Chinese 
minority, these Christians were, by the early twentieth century, conspicuously 
overrepresented in the ranks of the small but growing urban middle class of traders, 
professionals, and civil servants. By the time of independence this small Christian 
minority—thanks to early exposure to the urban cash economy (e.g. in the ethnic 
Chinese case), privileged access to Western-style education (e.g. missionary schools), 
and discriminatory state policies (e.g. in recruitment to the colonial army)—enjoyed a 
privileged position in business, the state bureaucracy (including the Army), and the 
urban social £lite.20
Against this backdrop, Christian elements of the urban middle class were to forge 
close linkages with the embryonic Suharto regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
University lecturers and student activists affiliated with the Partai Katolik and other 
Christian groups joined the rallies against the PKI and Soekamo in the critical first 
months of the New Order, and enjoyed something of a hegemonic position as the 
regime's leading political operatives for years to come. Most notoriously, General Ali 
Moertopo, close Suharto associate, political fixer, and head of Opsus (Special 
Operations), cultivated relations with a cluster of (ethnic-Chinese) Catholic activists
18 Hotman M. Siahaan and Tjahjo Pumomo W., Pamong Mengabdi Desa: Biografi Mohammad Noer 
(Surabaya: Yayasan Keluarga Bhakti dan Surabaya Post, 1997).
19 Burhan Djabier Magenda, "The Surviving Aristocracy in Indonesia: Politics in Three Provinces of the 
Outer Islands" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1989).
20 On the close linkage between Christianity and education in Indonesia, see Gavin W. Jones, "Religion 
and Education in Indonesia," Indonesia 22 (October 1976): 19-56.
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like Harry Tjan Silalahi and the brothers Yusuf and Sofyan Wanandi (Liem Bian Kie 
and Liem Bian Koen) who, with Moertopo's blessings, founded the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) in the early 1970s. This clique of "political 
technocrats" helped craft the defusion of Konfrontasi, draft die blueprint for ASEAN, 
build up Golkar and mastermind its first electoral success in 1971, and put an 
internationally palatable "spin" on the invasion of East Timor in 1975.21
Besides this tight-knit clique of Catholic activists and operatives, a somewhat 
broader pool of intellectuals associated with the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSD claimed 
small pockets of influence within the regime.22 Best known since the 1950s as die party 
of Westernized (and often Dutch-speaking), secularized "administrators" and urban 
professionals, the PSI had never commanded much in die way of a popular electoral 
base (and was banned in 1960 for its role in the CIA-backed regional rebellions of 1957- 
59), but its leading members and their ideas and broader .sensibility long held a 
position of privilege and respect in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, among the 
top leadership of the Army, on university campuses, and in the press.23 Crucially, PSI 
leaders enjoyed considerable credibility and close contacts among the regime's 
international backers, especially the US government. With prominent aristocrats and 
modernist Moslems among its leaders and sympathizers, the more loosely structured 
PSI network also had a potentially broader purchase than the more exclusivist (and 
secretive) Catholic jaringan centered in the CSIS. These PSI strengths were well 
recognized by Suharto in the fragile first years of the New Order, as suggested by early 
appointments such as that of PSI luminary and respected economist Professor 
Soemitro Djojohadikusumo as Trade and Industry Minister in 1968.24
Yet in the byzantine politics of Jakarta in the 1970s and 1980s, PSI-linked networks 
were relegated to semi-outsider status and viewed as potentially more oppositional 
than their Catholic rivals based in the CSIS.25 PSI leaders were closely linked with the 
"New Order radicals" of the Army's (West Java) Siliwangi Division, who were soon 
marginalized in favor of Suharto and his (Central Java) Diponegoro Division cronies. 
PSI associates and sympathizers were also among those blamed for the so-called 
Malari riots of January 1974, which precipitated the downfall of the avowedly 
"professional" security chief General Soemitro, a bitter rival of Ali Moertopo and his 
CSIS operatives.26
21 Richard Tanter, "Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia, 
1966-1989" (PhD dissertation, Monash University, 1991), pp. 321-325,430-432.
22 Donald Hindley, "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order," Indonesia 9 (April 1970): 23-66.
23 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1962), pp. 129-131; Rudolf M rizek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Southeast Asia Program, 1994), pp. 403-457.
24 See Subroto, "Recollections of My Career," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 34 ,2  (August 1998): 
67-92, especially pp. 70-76.
25 See the exhaustive account in Francois Raillon, Les etudiants indonisiens et YOrdre Nouveau: Politique et 
idiologie du Mahasiswa Indonesia (1966-1974) (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de Thomme, 1984).
26 See, fox example, the highly tendentious account of PSI history and activities in Marzuki Arifin S.E., 
Fakta, Arnlisa Lengkap dan Latar Belakang Peristiwa 15 Januari 1974 (Jakarta: Publishing House Indonesia, 
1974), especially pp. 21-75.
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Subsequent years still saw a handful of "technocratic" and PSI-ish Soemitro 
prot£g£s, most notably Environment Minister Emil Salim, occupying Cabinet posts, 
but the ascendancy and long entrenchment of the Catholic General Benny Murdani as 
security and intelligence czar in the 1980s maintained the upper hand for CSIS. The 
two rival networks reached something of a stand-off and modus vivendi in Golkar, the 
DPR, and the Cabinet, on £lite university campuses, and in the media, where the 
Catholic-run Kompas evolved into Jakarta's newspaper of record and the PSI-ish 
magazine Tempo became the nation's most respected weekly. Feeding the growing 
circulation of such publications, the steady flow of students through the nation's top 
universities over the years reproduced the social base and source of recruitment for 
these two rival networks as they orbited within the upper echelons of civilian power in 
the regime.
Finally, and perhaps most problematically, the country's historically strong and 
autonomous networks of Islamic worship, education, and political organization were 
most weakly integrated into the power structures of the New Order. Unlike the British 
in Malaya, for example, the Dutch had by and large allowed Islamic schools, places of 
worship, scholars, and preachers to remain outside the control of the indigenous 
aristocracy and the emerging bureaucratic state. Against this backdrop, a variety of 
autonomous Islamic associations had emerged in the course of the early twentieth 
century, most notably the largely urban and self-consciously "m odernist" 
Muhammadiyah (established in 1912) and the more rural-based and "traditionalist" 
Nahdlatul Ulama or NU (founded in 1926).27 These two powerful Islamic associations, 
first drawn into openly "political" activities by the Japanese authorities during the 
Occupation, served as the bases for many local anti-Dutch forces during the Revolution 
and later for two major political parties (Masjumi and NU) in the Soekamo era.28
Based in local institutions of Islamic worship and learning like the traditionalist 
pesantren (school of Koranic studies) and the modernist madrasah (Islamic school), these 
historically autonomous and socially embedded Moslem networks were marginalized 
and alienated by the militarizing, centralizing, and Westernizing tendencies of the 
Suharto regime in the 1970s and 1980s.29 NU party leaders played a crucial role in the 
student protests and pseudo-parliamentary maneuvers that led to Soekamo's downfall 
in 1966, and NU activists in regions like East Java provided the shock troops for the 
massacres of PKI members and sympathizers, but by the early 1970s the association 
was openly at odds with the Suharto regime.30 The 1971 election saw NU competing
27 Deliar Noer, "The Rise and Development of the Modernist Muslim Movement during the Dutch 
Colonial Period (1900-1942)" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1963); Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan 
Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama (Solo: Jatayu Sala, 1985).
28 See Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation 1942- 
1945 (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1958).
29 The (mostly NU-affiliated) pesantren, moreover, were not only rural-based but also run by kyai who, 
perhaps somewhat like the PNI-affiliated Javanese priyayi and Outer Island aristocrats, were enmeshed in 
local family networks and bonds of intermarriage with other kyai dynasties. On this minor (but rather 
critical) point, see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, "Kinship and Marriage Among the Javanese Kyai," Indonesia 29 
(April 1980): 47-58.
30 See Andr£e Feillard, Islam et Armie Dans L'lndonisie Contemporaine (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), pp. 63- 
138; Agus Sunyoto, Battser Berjihad Menumpas PKI (Tulungagung: Pesulukan Thoriqoh Agung, 1996);
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intensely with the regime's political machine Golkar for votes in strongholds like East 
Java.31 Subsequent years saw the loss of NU control over die Ministry of Religion and 
the association's forced fusion with other Moslem groups into a single political party, 
the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP), which was 
subjected to heavy-handed government restrictions.32
Activists from the Muhammadiyah-linked student group HMI (Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Students' Association) had also joined in the anti-PKI rallies 
and anti-Soekamo maneuvers of 1965-66, but they and other modernist Muslim leaders 
were to be deeply disappointed by their exclusion from the regime in subsequent 
years. The modernist party Masjumi, banned since 1960 for its role in the regional 
rebellions, was prevented from regrouping and competing in the 1971 polls, and 
modernist Moslem leaders were forced to join with their traditionalist NU counterparts 
in the PPP in subsequent electoral contests.33 Masjumi activists were among those 
blamed for the Malari riots of January 1974,34 and intelligence operations 
masterminded in subsequent years by CSIS patron Ali Moertopo and later by the 
Catholic intelligence and security chief General Benny Murdani worked both to 
discredit certain modernist Moslem groups as fanatics and terrorists and to justify their 
harsh repression.35 With abangan (nominal) Moslems and Christians occupying a 
hegemonic position in the Palace, the Armed Forces, the Cabinet, Golkar, and the DPR 
in the 1970s and 1980s, many devout Moslems understandably saw themselves as 
unfairly excluded from the corridors of power. Hence the impressive showing of the 
PPP in Jakarta and a few other regions of the country in the elections of 1977 and 1982.
But meanwhile state policies and social trends over the three decades of the 
Suharto era worked gradually to propel new generations of devout Moslems socially 
"upwards" and into the orbit of the New Order state. The anti-communist hysteria of 
the early Suharto years, for example, drove millions of Indonesians to seek refuge in 
religious identity, institutions, and faith in the mid-late 1960s, including millions of 
Moslems of previously more abangan orientation. New government regulations 
requiring all citizens to declare their faith, expanding religion classes in state schools, 
and impeding inter-faith marriages strengthened the public markers and boundaries of 
Moslem identity.36
Over the thirty-two years of the New Order, moreover, the system of Islamic 
education in Indonesia grew considerably. Even traditional, rural boarding schools 
(pesantren) evolved in die direction of the modernist, more Western-style madrasah, and
Hermawan Sulistyo, "The Forgotten Years: The Missing History of Indonesia's Mass Slaughter (Jombang- 
Kediri, 1965-1966)" (PhD dissertation, Arizona State University, 1997).
31 Ken W ard, The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Papers on 
Southeast Asia, 1974), especially pp. 90-113,157-178.
32 Feillard, Islam et Armde, pp. 125-127,143-156.
33 Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia 
(Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980), pp. 78-141.
34 Arifin, Fakta, pp. 21-75.
35 On the repression of Islamic activists and organizations in the 1980s, see Human Rights Watch, Human 
Rights in Indonesia and East Timor (New York: Human Rights W atch, 1989), pp. 76-85.
36 On these trends, see Robert W. Hefner, "Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java," 
Journal of Asian Studies 46,3 (August 1987): 533-554.
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Islamic colleges like local Universitas Muhammadiyah and the branches of the state- 
run IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negara or State Islamic Institute) expanded steadily in 
tandem with rapid urbanization and economic growth.37 Thus by the early 1990s, the 
rising number of Indonesians schooled under a distinctly, self-consciously "Islamic" 
rubric had become a visible feature of turban society in many parts of the archipelago. 
The public sphere of modem, urban middle-class life, for the very first time in 
Indonesian history, was now also claimed by those who defined themselves as pious 
Moslems.38
At the same time, this sociological sea change also swept rising numbers of— 
mostly "modernist"—devout Moslems into the nation's top 61ite universities and, by 
die late 1980s, into circulation within the corridors of the regime and its para-statal 
subsidiaries. HMI student leaders from £lite schools like Yogyakarta's Universitas 
Gadjah Mada (UGM), Bandung's Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB), and Jakarta's 
Universitas Indonesia (UI) were recruited in record numbers into the bureaucracy, the 
business world, and Golkar, as suggested by the rise of men like Mar'ie Muhammad, 
Ridwan Saidi, Adi Sasono, and Akbar Tanjung during this period. Within the Armed 
Forces, parallel trends were also visible with the ascendancy of devout Moslem officers 
such as General Try Sutrisno to top leadership positions in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.
Against this backdrop, and in the context of the Catholic security czar General 
Benny Murdani's fall from power, the last ten years of the New Order saw President 
Suharto make assiduous efforts to incorporate die country's Islamic networks into the 
circuitries of regime power. As is well known, the President and countless other 
government officials made the pilgrimage to Mecca and began to signal in myriad 
other ways that the Islamic faith enjoyed a privileged position in Indonesian public 
life. In 1990, moreover, Suharto gave his blessings to the founding of ICMI, the Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Islamic Intellectuals), 
led by his long-time close associate and Minister for Research and Technology, Prof. 
Dr. Ir .B .J. Habibie.
In ICMI and the multistranded patronage empire of Habibie, modernist Moslems 
had gained, for the very first time, a jaringan  of their own along the innermost 
corridors of power. Since the late 1970s, Suharto had promoted the establishment of a 
vast military-industrial complex under Habibie's aegis. As Minister of Research and 
Technology, Habibie controlled a sprawling empire of ten state-owned enterprises 
grouped under the Coordinating Agency for Strategic Industries, most notably 
Krakatau Steel, shipbuilder PT PAL, and aircraft producer IPTN. In a country where 
the predominance of a "pariah" ethnic-Chinese business class, the legacies of Revolusi, 
and the luxury of oil revenues legitimated an £tatiste industrialization strategy, 
Habibie built up an enormous state-based patronage empire outside military and
37 Sidney Jones, "The Javanese Pesantren: Between Elite and Peasantry," in Reshaping Local Worlds: Formal 
Education and Cultural Change in Rural Southeast Asia, ed. Charles F. Keyes (New Haven: Yale University 
Southeast Asia Studies Monograph Series, 1991), pp. 19-41; M. Dawan Rahardjo, "The Kyai, the Pesantren 
and the Village: A Preliminary Sketch," Prisma 1 ,1 (May 1975): 32-43; and FeiUard, Islam et Arm&e, pp. 225- 
237.
38 For signs of this trend, see, for example, the set of articles on "Boom Dai" in Tempo, April 11,1992, pp. 
13-23.
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technocrat control in the name of high-tech economic nationalism. Through his hold 
over "strategic industries" and responsibility for infrastructure projects and industrial 
development schemes, Habibie wielded considerable discretion over government 
personnel and contracts and built up an enormous clientele—mostly of urban, 
modernist, university-educated pribumi ("indigenous") Moslems—within die state and 
in private business circles.39
With Hie founding of ICMI in 1990, moreover, Habibie also created a new rubric for 
the patronage and cooptation of Islamic institutions, from mosques and schools to 
publishing ventures, think-tank activities and dakwah (preaching) groups. From its 
inception, ICMI and its leaders used these impressive resources to attract activists from 
a variety of Islamic associations and to broaden its influence in the state and deepen its 
reach within society.40 Over the 1990s, Suharto engineered the elevation of Habibie to 
the governing body of Golkar, various Habibie proteges to key Cabinet positions, and 
a close Habibie associate, General Feisal Tanjung, as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces.41
Meanwhile, a steady process of ICMI-isasi moved forward in Golkar, in the 
awarding of state contracts, on many university campuses, and beyond, in tandem 
with so-called de-Benny-isasi. An ICMI-affiliated think-tank, CIDES (Center for 
Information and Development Studies), soon began to compete with the Catholic CSIS, 
and its daily newspaper Republika tried (less successfully) to rival the Catholic-owned 
Kompas. ICMI support and influence soon extended to Islamic publishers, preachers, 
and pilgrims, into pesantren, madrasah, and IAIN, and to figures within both NU and 
Muhammadiyah. With Habibie at its helm, ICMI incorporated an expanding jaringan 
of Moslem professionals and "professional Moslems" into the circuitries of the 
regime.42
Yet both the limitations and the dangers of this pattern of social incorporation were 
soon visible within the corridors of state power in Jakarta and in Indonesian society at 
large. For if the logic of sirkulasi propelled new generations of triumphant "modernist" 
Moslem arrivistes upward and into the upper echelons of the regime, the accumulation 
of wealth and self-perpetuation in power by the President and his family imposed a 
ceiling on any further ICMI-ish ambitions for the foreseeable future. Suharto children, 
after all, had also won seats on the governing board of Golkar and begun to lobby for 
their own minions and allies in the Parliament, the Armed Forces, and the Cabinet. 
Their huge conglomerates continued to capture the juiciest state contracts and
39 On Habibie, see Takashi Shiraishi, "Rewiring the Indonesian State," in Making Indonesia: Essays on 
Modem Indonesia in Honor of George McT. Kahin, ed. Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey (Ithaca: Cornell 
Southeast Asia Program, 1996), pp. 164-179.
40 For two contrasting views of these trends, see Robert Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and 
the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," Indonesia 56 (October 1993): 1-37; and R. William Liddle, 
"The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation," Journal of Asian Studies 55,3 (August 1996): 613- 
634.
41 The Editors, "The Sixth Development Cabinet Announced March 17,1993," Indonesia 55 (April 1993): 
167-176.
42 See, for example, Darul Aqsha, Dick van der Meij, and Johan Hendrik Meuleman, Islam in Indonesia: A 
Survey of Events and Developments form 1988 to March 1993 (Jakarta: Indonesia-Netherlands Cooperation in 
Islamic Studies, 1995), pp. 263-276.
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monopoly concessions, as Tommy Suharto's 1996 "national car" project amply 
attested. So long as Suharto was President, his children would remain entrenched at 
the pinnacle of New Order power.
"Islam ," moreover, would also remain an overly ambitious banner in a nation 
boasting the single largest Moslem population and the most popular non­
governmental Islamic organizations in the world. With their long histories, deep roots 
in society, and widely divergent theological, institutional, and sociological 
underpinnings, NU and Muhammadiyah could hardly be so easily captured—or their 
leaders coopted—by an ICMI-based network emanating from the state. In short, the 
considerable autonomy of associational life and the great plurality of views long found 
in the Indonesian Islamic community made the creation and enforcement of a 
hegemonic state-based "Islam" an ultimately unrealizable project.43
Indeed, the promise of a majoritarian "Islam " as a rubric for the social 
advancement of millions of Indonesian Moslems ran up against the reality of a highly 
centralized and narrowly based pattern of dlite circulation and capital accumulation 
under the Suharto regime. Year after year, thousands of Moslem youth left the nation's 
pesantren, madrasah, IAIN, and other schools and universities for the job market, only to 
find opportunities for civil service employment or upward social mobility in the 
private sector highly limited, even in the era of ICMI and expanding Islamic jaringan.4* 
As the Jakarta-based "Chinese" konglomerat and the Suharto children's business 
empires extended their reach throughout the archipelago with new factories and 
marketing networks, incorporating millions of Indonesians into new circuitries of 
production and consumption, popular resentment grew against the patterns of 
marginalization engendered by the very nature of New Order capitalism.
In this context, "Islam" in the 1990s was to provide not just new trappings for 
urban middle-class propriety, but an appealing idiom for a wave of mounting popular 
protest. By the 1980s, Indonesians in various parts of the archipelago, whether Moslem, 
Christian, or (as in Bali) Hindu, had begun to mobilize in countless local struggles 
against the increasing impingements of Jakarta-based konglomerat on community lands 
and livelihoods. Farmers fought vigorously against the conversion of their rice fields 
into dam projects, golf courses and factory belts, as did fishermen against the 
reclamation of shorelands, and urban slum residents against new evictions and 
construction .45 Small-scale traders and street vendors protested against the 
encroachments of department stores and shopping malls,46 and, despite heavy 
restrictions on union organizing and strikes, factory workers held work stoppages and 
other actions to raise wages and improve labor conditions.47 Even the planned bridge
43 On this key general point, see Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, "In Search of Oppositions: South East Asia in 
Focus," Government and Opposition 32,4 (Autumn 1997): 578-597.
44 See Chris Manning and P. N. Junankar, "Choosy Youth or Unwanted Youth? A Survey of 
Unemployment," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 34,1 (April 1998): 55-94.
45 See, for example, the fine study of the fiercely contested Kedungombo dam project in Central Java by 
Stanley, Seputar Kedung Ombo (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat, 1994).
46 Ir. Herlianto, Urbanisasi, Pembangunan, dan Kerusuhan Kota (Bandung: Penerbit Alumni, 1997).
47 See Vedi R. Hadiz, Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia (London: Routledge, 1997); and Douglas 
Kammen, "A  Time To Strike: Industrial Strikes and Changing Class Relations in New Order Indonesia" 
(PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1997).
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between Surabaya and Madura foundered in the face of opposition from local Islamic 
leaders.48 By the early 1990s, in cities and towns throughout Indonesia, local, popular 
manifestations of macet were clearly on the rise.
hi short, the New Order regime incorporated a diverse set of social Elites into its 
orbit through networks or jaringan. In the case of ethnic-Chinese businessmen, the 
linkages were based on narrow financial ties, with "pariah" status allowing for capital 
accumulation but impeding inclusion in the circuitries of state power. For "native" 
aristocrats like the Javanese priyayi, the logic of central state sirkulasi also imposed a 
definite ceiling on local family network penetration of the upper echelons of the New 
Order regime. Instead, the most important path for social networking and regime 
incorporation was located in die national system of modem tertiary education, in 
which a small minority of Christians and Westernized PSI-ish Moslems entrenched 
themselves in the early New Order years, but through which new jaringan of (mostly 
"modernist") devout Moslems were triumphant late-comers by the late 1980s and early 
1990s.
This pattern of jaringan-based  incorporation into the power circuitries of the 
Suharto regime thus reproduced and reshaped existing social networks in Indonesian 
politics, through steady streams of students recruited via the nation's top universities 
into the New Order power £lite. Such a pattern of sirkulasi was perhaps inevitable 
under such a conservative, bureaucratized form of authoritarian rule and in a society 
with a "pariah" business class engaged in capital accumulation but long excluded from 
the circuitries of state power. It also prefigured the nature and consequences of the 
macet to come.
4. Countdown to M acet: 1988-1997
Indeed, the final decade of the Suharto era witnessed an acceleration in capital 
flows and circulation within the state, but also the emergence and attempted 
management of incipient macet. Beginning in die late 1980s, the dismissal of long-time 
Armed Forces chief and intelligence czar General Benny Murdani and the above- 
mentioned elevation of civilians to new heights of influence in the regime inspired 
disaffected elements in the military establishment to promote oppositional forces and 
activities against the President and the cluster of private interests linked to the Palace.
With Murdani remaining as Defense Minister (1988-93) and his countless proteges 
still entrenched in various key military and civilian circuitries within the regime, 
Catholic and PSI-ish jaringan soon mobilized into action, championing the causes of the 
urban middle and working classes that had grown so rapidly over the years and 
remained so weakly incorporated into the orbit of Suharto's New Order. Thus, 
journalists and parliamentarians received encouragement and assistance in exposes of 
government corruption and criticisms of government policies. Student groups, non­
governmental organizations, human rights groups, and even labor unions enjoyed a 
measure of tolerance (and in some cases, backing) previously withheld.49 Leaders of
48 Muthmainnah, Jembatan Suramadu: Respon Ulatm terhadap Industrialisasi (Yogyakarta: LKPSM, 1998).
49 Edward Aspinall, "Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto 
Period," Indonesia 59 (April 1995): 21-44.
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mass organizations once firmly subordinated to the New Order hierarchy began to 
display new-found independence, most notably Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly 
known as Gus Dur) of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), who refused to join or support ICMI, 
and Megawati Soekamoputri (daughter of Indonesia's first president), who, with the 
blessings of certain high-ranking Army officers, assumed the leadership of the Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia (PDD in 1993.50
Meanwhile, Murdani-linked military elements also began to apply pressure for 
sirkulasi in the innermost corridors of power in Jakarta. In 1988, a sudden interupsi by 
one Armed Forces' representative in the MPR expressed military opposition to the 
selection of former Golkar chief Sudharmono as vice-president, an unprecedented 
display of internal dissent. Five years later, in 1993, military delegates in the MPR went 
even further, forcing Suharto's hand by announcing the Armed Forces' choice for the 
vice-presidency: General Try Sutrisno, the outgoing Armed Forces Commander. The 
military establishment had begun to prepare—and to push—for sirkulasi at the hub of 
New Order state power.
Finally, in 1994, against the backdrop of these ominous developments, President 
Suharto began to undertake a dramatic crackdown on oppositional forces inside and 
outside the regime and to engineer a major consolidation of his personal authority. 
Major publications like the PSI-ish weekly Tempo were closed down, errant journalists 
were blacklisted, and censorship was intensified. Outspoken regime critics in the 
national press, the parliament, and the universities were bought off or bullied into 
silence. Labor leaders, student activists, and human rights lawyers came to face 
harassment and imprisonment for activities branded as subversive and reminiscent of 
the defunct Communist Party (PKI). Public figures like NU's Gus Dur found 
themselves virtually under siege, as regime-backed interlopers and intrigues worked 
to undermine their leadership of mass organizations.51
Meanwhile, a purge of the Armed Forces ranks and a series of promotions 
removed suspected Murdani loyalists and other officers deemed insufficiently 
"reliable" from key posts and installed Palace favorites in their stead. General Hartono, 
an officer known for his deep involvement in the ongoing crackdown and his close 
relations with the President's favorite daughter, was installed as the Army Chief of 
Staff, while General Feisal Tanjung, an ICMI supporter and associate of Minister 
Habibie, was entrenched as Armed Forces Commander. Meanwhile, several other 
presidential favorites, most notably son-in-law Maj. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, received 
promotions to key garrisons in Jakarta.52
This cleansing of the regime's core arteries coincided with the clearing of unwanted 
pedestrians and political "traffic violators" from all major city streets. The culmination 
of this crackdown and consolidation came in July 1996, as security forces stormed the 
Jakarta headquarters of the PDI to enforce the ouster of popular leader Megawati from 
the party leadership. When crowds "rioted" in Central Jakarta in protest, hundreds
50 See, inter alia, Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, pp. 230-263.
51 An early, but excellent, account of these developments is provided in The Limits to Openness: Human 
Rights in Indonesia and East Timor (New York: Human Rights W atch/Asia, 1994).
52 The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: September 1,1993 - September 30,1995," 
Indonesia 60 (October 1995): 101-146.
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were detained and arrested, including prominent labor leader Mochtar Pakpahan, and 
the event was (implausibly) blamed on a militant student and NGO activist group, the 
Partai Rakyat Demokrasi (People's Democratic Party or PRD).53
This government crackdown effectively relegated to the sidelines those networks 
least incorporated into New Order avenues of 61ite circulation and capital 
accumulation but most capable of creating popular forms of macet in the streets. PRD 
leaders were detained and condemned to long jail sentences, and other student and 
NGO activists faced intensified repression and surveillance. SBSI (Serikat Buruh 
Sejahtera Indonesia, Indonesian Prosperous Workers' Union), the labor federation led 
by the now jailed Mochtar Pakpahan, suffered similar restrictions on its organizing 
efforts. The ousted PDI leader Megawati found her various legal attempts to achieve 
reinstatement effectively thwarted by the courts,54 and close ally Gus Dur began to 
distance himself from her cause and to adopt a more conciliatory stance towards the 
regime. This defensive posture was adopted in the face of renewed government efforts 
to oust Gus Dur from the NU leadership as well a broader campaign to discredit him 
and his organization.55
With the inner corridors of state power and the nation's city streets thus cleared of 
unwanted pedestrians, political "traffic violators" and other potential roadblocks, the 
Golkar machinery was revved up once again, to bulldoze its way to victory in the 
heavily restricted May 1997 elections and pave the road to Suharto's reanointment to 
the presidency by the MPR in March 1998. Yet a vigorous PPP campaign rallied 
thousands in the streets of many cities and towns, and local PPP branches staged 
unprecedented post-election protests in several towns in East Java which created 
embarrassing delays in the polling. More violence and trickery were clearly necessary 
to maintain the image of smooth circulation within the state in the face of incipient 
kemacetan politik on the ground.
In addition, Suharto's efforts to contain and silence dissenting voices within the 
military and civilian hierarchies of the regime had the effect of increasing his reliance 
on a narrowing circle of close family members and friends. Suharto's favorite 
daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana or Mbak Tutut, played a prominent role in the 
election campaign and assumed a position of considerable power both as a member of 
the Golkar governing body and, since her mother's death in 1996, as one of her 
widowed father's most prominent advisors. ICMI chief B. J. Habibie also won greater 
prominence, along with a top Golkar post and rising speculation that he would be 
named to the vice presidency in 1998. Meanwhile, post-election rotations left Suharto 
son-in-law Maj. Gen. Prabowo Subianto in command of Kopassus (Special Forces), and 
a former presidential adjutant, General Wiranto, as Army Chief of Staff. Never before 
in New Order history had the uppermost echelons of the regime been captured by 
such a narrow cluster of Palace cronies, henchmen, and, crucially, relatives.
53 Gibran Ajidarma and Irawan Saptono, Peristhoa 27 Juli (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi/Aliansi 
Jumalis Independen, 1997); Agus Siswantoro, Dibalik Penyerbuan Kantor DPP-PDl: Dinegeri Sendiri Sakitpun 
Tak Boleh Menjerit (Jakarta: Upaya Warga Negara, 1996).
54 On the July 1996 attack on the PDI headquarters and its aftermath, see Ajidarma, Peristhoa 27 Juli.
55 See Greg Fealy, "The 1994 NU Congress and Aftermath: Abdurrahman Wahid, Suksesi and the Battle for 
Control of N U," in Nahdlatul Warm, Traditioml Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, ed. Greg Barton and Greg 
Fealy (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 19% ), pp. 257-277.
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Meanwhile, this incipient clogging of the regime's core arteries only heightened 
pressures on the main pathways of social circulation. The onset of the crackdown in 
1994 coincided with a precipitous increase in the frequency and intensity of anti- 
Chinese, anti-Christian, and other inter-ethnic violence. Over the next few years, 
crowds burned and looted "Chinese" shops and places of worship in towns and cities 
scattered across Indonesia, including Medan in 1994, Situbondo and Tasikmalaya in 
1996, and Banjarmasin and Ujungpandang in 1997. In early 1997, clashes between 
Madurese and Dayaks in West Kalimantan led to the deaths of hundreds and the 
displacement of thousands of people in the area.56 Periodic church burnings, most 
notably in East Java, left more than three hundred Catholic and Protestant houses of 
worship in ashes.57 Sporadic anti-"Chinese" riots and church burnings had occurred in 
Indonesia in previous years, but never so often or so widely.
While the proximate causes of the riots varied from case to case, in virtually every 
instance a common set of circumstances provided a backdrop to the attacks on 
"Chinese" shops and places of worship. Firstly, in all cases, local residents clearly 
nursed resentment of the wealth, economic power, and social prominence enjoyed by 
ethnic-Chinese businessmen, with long-held accusations of "kolusi" with local 
authorities and simmering disputes over land, church construction permits, and 
residential arrangements heavy in the air.58 Moreover, in many cases, such sentiments 
were coupled with widely held grievances against the local authorities for various 
misdeeds, ranging from land evictions to imposition of an unpopular Golkar victory 
on a strongly pro-PPP community. In addition, well entrenched Islamic schools, like 
the pesantren in towns like Situbondo or the IAIN in cities like Ujungpandang, seemed 
to have socialized young Moslem men in a self-consciously Islamic atmosphere but not 
to guarantee adequate upward mobility in the form of well-paying jobs. In many cases, 
students from Islamic schools provided the "shock troops" of die riots.59
Finally, in all cases, die stance of the local and national authorities seemed to 
encourage anti-"Chinese" violence. At the very least, police and military authorities 
tended to exercise considerable restraint in their reaction to anti-"Chinese" riots, 
whether out of fear of causing further violence, sympathy for the rioters, or more 
cynical reasons.60 In many instances, moreover, it was in reaction to local government 
decisions, like court rulings or police beatings, that angry mobs took to the streets, 
burning government buildings as well as "Chinese" shops.
56 Human Rights W atch/Asia, Indonesia: Communal Violence in West Kalimantan (New York Human Rights 
W atch/Asia, 1997).
57 See Paul Tahalele and Thomas Santoso, eds., Beginikah Kemerdekaan Kita? (Surabaya: Forum Komunikasi 
Kristiani Surabaya—Indonesia, 1997).
58 See Perilaku Kekerasan Kolektif. Kondisi dan Pemicu (Yogyakarta: Pusat Penelitian Pembangunan Pedesaan 
dan Kawasan, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1997).
59 Draft Laporan Survai Peristiwa Situbondo 10 Oktober 1996 (Yogyakarta: Institut DIAN/Interfidei, 1997); 
Amuk Banjarmasin (Jakarta: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, 1997); Huru-Hara 
Rengasdengklok (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1997); Amuk Makassar (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus 
Informasi, 1998).
60 The Editors, "The Indonesian Military in the Mid-1990s: Political Maneuvering or Structural Change?," 
Indonesia 63 (April 1997): 104.
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In some cases, there were also suspicions that the riots had been instigated by 
elements within the regime. Similar rumors and accusations had arisen after the Malari 
riots in January 1974 and the disturbances in Solo and Semarang in late 1980, against 
the backdrop of mounting tension between rival factions in the Armed Forces.61 Some 
analysts had likewise attributed the series of events leading to the November 1991 
Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, East Timor, to a plot by forces associated with Suharto 
son-in-law (then Col.) Prabowo Subianto to discredit and dislodge rival officers allied 
with (Ret.) General Benny Murdani.62
In the case of the various anti-"Chinese" riots of 1994-97, by contrast, the evidence 
suggested something of a new pattern. Beyond theories linking the riots to local 
political squabbles, some reports provided evidence that the events in Situbondo and 
Tasikmalaya, for example, had been provoked or even staged to discredit and 
undermine Gus Dur by creating disturbances in well-known NU bailiwicks. In 
addition, these reports suggested, the riots were intended to embolden Indonesian 
Moslems to push for new gains in a larger struggle to overcome Chinese and Christian 
hegemony in the country's business and social life. Such reports implicated not only 
certain elements within the Armed Forces, but also Islamic activists associated with 
ICMI.63
If the. pattern of sirkulasi within the regime had shifted to include a new 61ite 
Moslem jaringan, the diversion of macet into "riots" now facilitated the repression of 
those figures and networks most firmly located outside the regime and capable of 
mobilizing a mass base against it. The July 1996 upheaval in Jakarta had forced 
Megawati out of the 1997 elections, sidelined the leader of the country's largest 
independent union federation, and driven a budding network of militant student, 
labor, and NGO activists virtually underground. Gus Dur and his followers in NU 
suffered a similar fate after the Situbondo and Tasikmalaya riots several months later, 
as suggested by the imprisonment, torture, and in at least one instance death of local 
NU activists in these two towns, and by Gus Dur's much disparaged embrace of Mbak 
Tutut and Golkar during die election campaign in 1997.
Thus the decade leading up to the current economic crisis in Indonesia saw a 
confluence of discernible trends within the Suharto regime and in Indonesian society at 
large. The President succeeded in squashing oppositional forces by purging his regime 
of potentially disloyal elements, cracking down on dissent, and further entrenching 
close family members and cronies, against a backdrop of fluid capital flows and 
ongoing military mutasi. Yet this pattern of political involution threatened to 
undermine the logic of internal regime sirkulasi and to precipitate the onset of macet.
61 For contrasting interpretations along such lines with regard to the Malari riots, see Arifin, Fakta; "Siapa 
Dalang Peristiwa M alari?," Forum Keadilm, May 26,1994, pp. 92-103; and Heru Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib 
Jenderal Soemitro dm  Peristiwa 15 Januari ‘74 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998). On die 1980 events in 
Central Java, see P. Bambang Siswoyo, Hunt Hara Soto Semarang (Solo: Bhakti Pertiwi, 1981).
62 The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," Indonesia 53 (April 1992): 98-99.
63 See, for example, the articles on "Operasi Naga Hijau" in Forum Keadilm, February 10,1997, pp. 12-21. 
Two unpublished (but well publicized) reports by NU-affiliated authors, "Draft Laporan Penelitian 
Kerusuhan Tasikmalaya 1996" and "Draft Buku Putih Situbondo," offer ample empirical evidence to 
support such conclusions. Copies of these two reports have been obtained by die author, including two 
different versions of die latter paper.
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The congestion at the heart of the New Order, moreover, combined with rising 
circulatory pressures within society to provoke frequent episodes of macet, in the form 
of localized, surgically operable "anti-Chinese riots" which only diverted and 
disrupted the flow of popular energies against die pattern of predatory accumulation 
by the Suharto children's konglomerat and impending constriction of circulation within 
the regime. It was in this highly inauspicious context that 1997 drew to a close and an 
emerging world economic crisis began to unfold.
5. January-April 1998: Kemacetan Kredit, Kemacetan Politik
Kemacetan kredit had set in. As international investors and lenders suddenly started 
to abandon long-popular East Asian markets in the latter half of 1997, the Indonesian 
economy suffered most of all, with the rupiah depreciating 70 percent and the Jakarta 
stock exchange index falling 50 percent from mid-July 1997 to early January 1998. 
Indonesia's vulnerability to such rapid fluctuations in world currency markets 
reflected both extremely high levels of overseas borrowing (especially private, 
unhedged, short-term debt) as well as widespread perceptions (and self-fulfilling 
predictions) that rising cronyism and nepotism made the economy extremely weak in 
the face of a crisis.64
Indeed, the downward spiral of crisis began to accelerate quite precipitously at the 
end of the year, as uncertainties regarding the stability of the Suharto regime 
multiplied. In late October 1997, the government announced an austerity program 
worked out with the IMF and began to shut down several ailing local banks, but the 
rupiah continued to plummet. With the largely appointed People's Consultative 
Assembly due to meet in March 1998 to name the president and vice-president for the 
next five-year term, rumors were rife in Jakarta about Suharto's health, his choice of 
running-mate, and the implications for subsequent succession scenarios.65
As early as November 1997, moreover, it became clear that the ongoing trends 
sketched in die pages above had conditioned the Suharto regime to view and respond 
to the unfolding crisis in essentially political terms. Early that month the President's 
son Bambang Trihatmodjo had reacted angrily to the inclusion of his Bank Andromeda 
/among the sixteen private banks targeted for government liquidation, initiating a 
lawsuit against the Cabinet officials responsible and speaking darkly of a conspiracy 
behind the decision. Significantly, the chief targets of his ire were Bank Indonesia 
Governor Soedradjad Djiwandono, son-in-law of PSI luminary Soemitro 
Djojohadikusumo and a Catholic with close links to CSIS, and widely respected 
Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad, former 1966 activist and leader of the modernist 
Moslem student group HMI, and a known foe of Habibie and his high-tech projects. 
These officials, Bambang Trihatmodjo's comments suggested, were part of a larger
64 International Monetary Fund, "Indonesia - Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies," January 
15,1998.
65 On die unfolding economic crisis, see: Ross H. McLeod, "Postscript to the Survey of Recent 
Developments: On Causes and Cures for the Rupiah Crisis," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 33,3 
(December 1997): 35-52; Hadi Soesastro and M. Chatib Basri, "Survey of Recent Developments," Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 34,1 (April 1998): 3-54.
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conspiracy to discredit his good name and that of his family. In a sense, of course, he 
was absolutely right.66
Events in December seemed to confirm the political nature of the crisis. In mid­
month, Suharto, apparently suffering after a minor stroke, took ten days' rest from his 
official duties, heightening speculation about his health and the succession question. 
By the first week of January 1998, rumors had clearly spun out of control and with 
devastating effects, sending the rupiah to a previously unimaginable level of 10,000 to 
the US dollar and setting off runaway inflation.67 A wave of panic-buying ensued in 
markets, stores, and supermarkets in various parts of the archipelago.68
The government response to this much-publicized course of events was swift but 
double-edged. On the one hand, by January 15, President Suharto had signed a new 
agreement with the IMF, committing Indonesia on paper both to new austerity 
measures and a set of bank restructuring, deregulation, privatization, tax reform, and 
liberalization programs in exchange for US$33 billion in new loans. As in previous 
periods of declining state revenues and private investment, the President now 
promised to open up new gateways into the circuitries of the economy, thus relieving 
the threat and build-up of macet.
On the other hand, this view of unfolding macet as propelled by political forces 
prevailed in the Palace, encouraging Suharto to adopt a tactic of staging new traffic 
diversions and disruptions. Top government officials, including Suharto, engaged in a 
series of maneuvers which served not only to undermine the supposedly confidence- 
inspiring effects of the IMF deal on global currency and equity markets, but also to 
create an atmosphere deeply hostile to the county's ethnic-Chinese business class and 
highly conducive to "anti-Chinese" riots. The diversion of macet, rather than the easing 
of siriculasi, was the strategy of the regime.
A number of government steps and statements, for example, served to heighten 
many observers' skepticism about the Suharto government's commitment to the deal 
with the IMF. As photos of President Suharto signing the agreement under the stem 
gaze of IMF Director Michel Camdessus circulated in the domestic and foreign media, 
Suharto began to play the "nationalist" card. Habibie was floated as his likely choice 
for the vice-presidency, despite well-known skepticism in international business and 
financial circles with regard to Habibie's expensive and as yet largely unproductive 
high-tech projects. Although the markets reacted violently to this news, with the 
rupiah slipping as low as 17,000 to the U.S. dollar, Habibie was soon officially 
endorsed as the candidate of Golkar and subsequently "elected" in mid-March by the 
tightly controlled People's Consultative Assembly as Vice President, along with 
Suharto as President, for the five-year term of 1998-2003.
66 See, for example, "Bambang Tri Gugat Menkeu ke PTUN: Ini Menyangkut Kredibilitas Saya," Surabaya 
Post, November 4,1997; "Bambang dan Probo PTUN-kan Pemerintah: Penutupan Bank Andromeda 
Sangat Ironis," Jawa Pos, November 4,1997; "Langkah Misterius di Balik Likuidasi," Forum Keadilan, 
November 17,1997; and "Di Balik Skenario Likuidasi 16 Bank," Infvbartk, November 1997, pp. 2-5.
67 "Inflasi Surabaya 21,21 persen," Surya, March 5,1998.
68 See, for example, "Isu Kudeta, Pasar Diseibu," Surya, Januari 9,1998, p. 1; and John McBeth, "Ground 
Zero," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 22,1998, pp. 14-17.
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Meanwhile, in more specific policy terms, Suharto and other Cabinet officials 
began to issue statements suggesting moves that contradicted the agreement with the 
IMF. Expensive projects of an avowedly "nationalist" bent would be continued despite 
pledges of an end to government subsidies, and monopolies officially due for 
termination would survive in new form, it was implied.69 More generally, the 
President and several Cabinet ministers began to question in public whether the terms 
of the IMF agreement were consistent with the Indonesian Constitution and with 
Pancasila, the official state ideology. Finally, Suharto and his advisors floated a plan to 
adopt a "Currency Board System," which would peg the Indonesian rupiah at 5,500 to 
the US dollar and require the government to commit its dwindling foreign reserves to 
the defence of an extremely weak and apparently unreliable local currency.70
In tandem with these apparently "nationalist" moves in the realm of economic 
policy, the Suharto regime also launched an unprecedented attack on the ethnic- 
Chinese business community. Part of this attack focused on Sofyan Wanandi, a 
businessman of Chinese ancestry and Catholic faith who was known not only for his 
control over a diversified group of companies, file Gemala Group, but also Ids close 
ties to the CSIS, the conservative think-tank that represented certain 
"Chinese"/Catholic business interests and retired military officers such as (Ret. Gen.) 
Benny Murdani.71
Wanandi had openly voiced skepticism about the government's willingness to 
implement the terms of file IMF agreement, patently refused to join the government- 
led "Cinta Rupiah" campaign, and reportedly expressed hopes that the vice president 
chosen for the 1998-2003 would be drawn from file Armed Forces.72 Rumors later 
circulating in Jakarta suggested that he had been lobbying for specific vice-presidential 
candidates—including incumbent Try Sutrisno and Army Chief of Staff General 
Wiranto—and that news of his views had angered and alarmed Suharto.73 In short, 
Wanandi represented a cluster of jaringan—Catholic, business, and military—seen as 
opposed to the Suharto regime's policies and to the vice-presidential candidacy of 
Habibie.
Against this backdrop, Sofyan Wanandi and his brother, CSIS board member Jusuf 
Wanandi, soon found themselves vulnerable to attack. On January 18,1998, just three 
days after the signing of the IMF agreement, a bomb exploded in an apartment in 
Jakarta, leading to an investigation headed by Greater Jakarta Regional Military 
Commander Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, a close ally of Maj. Gen. Prabowo, the 
President's son-in-law. The authorities subsequently blamed remnants of the PRD, the 
small leftish party scapegoated after the riots in July 1996, for the explosion but also 
claimed to have "discovered" documents linking PRD activists to the Wanandi 
brothers and CSIS. Through much of the month of February, front-page articles about
69 "Paket Reformasi IMF: Monopoli dan Kartel Jalan Terus?," D & R ,  February 28,1998, pp. 62-63.
70 On these developments, see, for example, John McBeth, "Double or Nothing," Far Eastern Economic 
Review, February 26,1998, pp. 14-17.
71 "Mereka Bicara tentang Sofyan dll," D& R ,  February 21,1998, pp. 29-33.
72 See, for example, Wanandi's comments as quoted in "CSIS: Konglomerat bisa kabur," Surya, January 18, 
1998, p. 1.
73 See also "Kontroversi Sofyan Wanandi Setelah Ledakan," Forum Keadilan, February 23,1998, pp. 12-21.
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the case were published in newspapers and magazines, demonstrations for the closure 
of CSIS were held by Islamic activists, and Sofyan Wanandi was brought in for 
repeated, lengthy interrogations by the authorities.74
News of the case faded and then disappeared entirely in early March as the 
People's Consultative Assembly convened and Suharto and Habibie were "elected" 
unanimously as President and Vice-President, respectively. If, as many analysts 
suspected, the campaign against Sofyan Wanandi and CSIS was at least partly 
intended to cow opponents to Habibie within business and military circles, then in 
these terms it could be deemed a success. Yet the attack on Sofyan Wanandi must also 
be seen against a broader pattern of government actions in January and February 1998, 
and with an eye to a wider set of consequences.
Indeed, in January and February 1998, ranking Indonesian government officials, 
including President Suharto, actively began to stoke popular resentments against 
ethnic Chinese businessmen in the country. Spokesmen for the Armed Forces, for 
example, issued statements revealing that then Armed Forces Commander General 
Feisal Tanjung had contacted thirteen of the nation's wealthiest ethnic-Chinese 
businessmen to demand that they join the "Cinta Rupiah" campaign and exchange 
their US dollars for Indonesian rupiah.75 Subsequent weeks saw mounting official 
attacks against unnamed currency speculators, described by the military's chief 
parliamentary representative as "traitors" and by President Suharto himself as part of 
a "conspiracy" to reduce the value of the rupiah to 20,000 to the US dollar.76 From the 
language used, it was abundantly clear to all who cared to read or listen that the 
President and his minions were referring not only to Sofyan Wanandi in particular but 
also to ethnic-Chinese businessmen in general.
In addition, top government officials, both civilian and military, actively 
encouraged Islamic groups to amplify and act upon these anti-Chinese sentiments. On 
the evening of January 23,1998, for example, an estimated four thousand activists from 
several key Islamic groups joined three thousand Kopassus (Special Forces) troops for 
an unprecedented and much-publicized breaking of the Ramadan fast at the Kopassus 
headquarters in Jakarta. This occasion brought together then Kopassus Commander 
Maj. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, the President's son-in-law, with prominent leaders of 
Islamic groups such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic 
Preaching Council), and KISDI, the Indonesian Committee for World Muslim 
Solidarity, both well known for their strident attacks on Christian and Chinese 
predominance in many spheres of Indonesian business and society.77
74 On this case, see, for example, the following magazine cover stories: "Bom untuk Konglomerat," D&R, 
February 7,1998, pp. 24-7; "Sofjan Wanandi dan CSIS," Gatra, February 14,1998, pp. 23-32; "Dituduh Apa 
Lagi Sofyan W anandi?," D&R, February 14,1998, pp. 20-21.
75 See "Panglima ABRI Telepon 13 Konglomerat," Kompas, January 15,1998, p. 1; "ABRI imbau nonpri jual 
dolar," Surya, January 15,1998, p. 1.
76 "Syarwan: Mereka Penghkianat," Republika, January 24,1998, p. 1; "'A da Yang Sengaja Goyang 
Indonesia'," Jawa Pos, February 12,1998, p. 1.
77 On these groups, see R. William Liddle, "Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political 
Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia," in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in 
Indonesian Islamic Thought, ed. Mark R. Woodward (Tempe: Arizona State University Program for
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These groups, already inclined and mobilized to support ICMI chairman Habibie's 
vice-presidential candidacy and to attack CSIS and Sofyan Wanandi, undoubtedly felt 
further emboldened by Maj. Gen. Prabowo's generous display of support for their 
activities. In a variety of publications and public fora—including a mid-February 
KISDI rally before thousands of supporters at Jakarta's Al-Azhar Mosque78—calls were 
voiced for a struggle against "traitors" and "liars" like Wanandi and his ilk.79 Activists 
like Hussein Umar, Secretary General of Dewan Dakwah, set out across the country to 
spread the message beyond Jakarta.
Meanwhile, both national and local government officials made clear that the 
definition of "treason" to the Indonesian nation would be understood in religiously 
and ethnically colored terms. From its inception, the regime had spoken of a "krisis 
moneter" (krismon) rather than a "krisis ekonomi," suggesting that both the source of, and 
the solution to, the crisis lay in the mastery and manipulation of currency markets. In 
early February 1998, moreover, following a meeting with Suharto, the government- 
created Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Religious Scholars' Council) called for a 
jihad (holy war) against "speculators and hoarders," defined broadly enough to cover 
the thousands of—mostly ethnic Chinese—shopkeepers, merchants, and businessmen 
scattered across the archipelago.80
In cities and towns in Java and various other parts of the country, newspapers were 
soon awash with reports of local police and military officials investigating and 
punishing suspected "hoarders."81 However this new crime was defined, it was clear, 
shopkeepers and merchants were now burdened with new "protection costs" on top of 
previous exactions and the rapidly rising cost of goods. In addition, as the falling 
rupiah and resultant inflation sent prices of essential commodities rocketing upwards, 
local authorities, from bupatis (regents) to regional military commanders, began to 
requisition amounts of the so-called "nine basic goods" for sale at specially Organized 
distribution centers called pasar murah.82 Many local Islamic groups soon launched 
parallel efforts, encouraging hopes about the possible role of pesantren and madrasah as 
distribution centers to replace the much disparaged "Chinese"-owned shops and 
marketing networks.83
Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), pp. 323-355; and Robert W. Heftier, "Print Islam: Mass Media and 
Ideological Rivalries Among Indonesian Muslims," Indonesia 64 (October 1997): 77-103.
78 "Ketua Kisdi: Sofyan Wanandi Pengkhianat," Memorandum, February 9,1998, p. 3.
79 See, for example, the various articles in Media Dakwah, February 1998, pp. 41-59.
80 On the MUI call for a jihad, see, for example, "Seruan Jihad untuk Siapa?," D & R ,  February 21,1998, pp. 
72-73; Masdar F. Mas'udi, "Call for Jihad 'may have caused riots'," Jakarta Post, February 20,1998, p. 1; and 
Rosdiansyah, "Seruan jihad MUI penyebab kerusuhan?," Surya, March 5,1998, p. 6.
81 See, for example, "Operasi Sembako, Dua Spekulan Diperiksa," Jawa Pos, January 16,1998, p. 11; 
"Diperiksa, Tiga Gudang Penyimpanan Sembako," Jawa Pos, January 18,1998, p. 12; "'C ari dan Temukan 
Para Penimbun'," Republika, February 15,1998, p. 1; "Penimbun Sembako di Padang Resmi Jadi 
Tersangka," Republika, February 18,1998, p. 5; "Pengusaha Giling Padi Trauma, Dituduh Menimbun," 
Rompas, February 21,1998, p. 11; and "13 Penimbun Sembako Jadi Tersangka," Republika, Februar 24,1998, 
p. 14.
82 See, for example, "Walikota Bangga, Warganya Gelar Pasar Murah Sembako," Surabaya Post, February 
27,1998, p. 5; "Bagi-bagi Sembako," Surabaya Post, February 28,1998, p. 3.
83 "Ponpes Jatim Jadi Distributor Sembako," Republika, February 19, p. 5; "Pesantren, Distributor 
Sembako?," Jam  Pos, February 25,1998, p. 4.
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In short, a wide variety of government statements and more concrete actions in the 
course of January and early February 1998 worked to create an atmosphere of public, 
officially-sanctioned suspicion and resentment not only towards national konglomerat 
like Sofyan Wanandi but also the thousands of ethnic-Chinese shopkeepers, merchants 
and businessmen scattered throughout the Indonesian archipelago. These steps were 
taken in a country whose government and majority population had long stigmatized 
the ethnic-Chinese minority as foreign and predatory, and shown considerable 
sympathy for heavy restraints on the unfettered operation of the so-called free market. 
These moves were made at a time when the most dramatic and broadly felt effects of 
the crisis—rapidly rising prices—were first being experienced directly via Chinese- 
owned shops and stores throughout the country. Small wonder that many Indonesians 
thus saw local ethnic-Chinese shopkeepers as profiting, rather than suffering, from the 
crisis, as perpetrators rather than victims of the conspiracies and crimes referred to by 
Suharto and his minions. With newspaper articles reporting almost daily about police 
and military riot-simulation exercises in various parts of the country, the stage was set 
for macet diversion and disruption.
Indeed, against this inauspicious backdrop, the months of January and February 
1998 saw a series of small-scale riots take place in a number of towns and cities around 
Indonesia, including Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Lombok, and Flores. In virtually all 
cases, the riots took the form of attacks on Chinese-owned shops or department stores, 
with looting and destruction of goods.84 In many cases, Catholic or Protestant churches 
were also targeted by the rioting crowds, leaving dozens of Christian houses of 
worship damaged, burned down, or entirely destroyed by mid-February according to 
one estimate at the time.85 Reports that some riots were started by outsiders who 
arrived in trucks or motorcycle convoys led some local and foreign journalists to 
conclude that many of these incidents had in fact been staged by elements within the 
regime.86
While the riots did not lead to any mass killings or spread much beyond 
ephemeral, local episodes, they understandably helped to create (or at least exacerbate) 
a climate of growing fear and uncertainty. Small-town ethnic-Chinese shopkeepers 
closed their shops and maintained an especially low profile (even during the 
traditionally cacaphonous Chinese New Year), while many of their wealthier 
counterparts in the big cities reportedly purchased open airplane tickets for Singapore 
or Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the dramatic and in some instances exaggerated coverage that the riots 
received in foreign media led to growing international worries regarding "social 
unrest" in Indonesia.87 Foreign governments issued statements of concern, dispatched
84 Indonesian newspapers and magazines featured hundreds of articles about the riots in January and 
February 1998. For an English-language summary, see Human Rights Watch, Indonesia Alert: Economic 
Crisis Leads to Scapegoating c f Ethnic Chinese (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), especially pp. 8-15.
85 "The Number of Churches Closed, Destroyed, or Burnt Down Every Month in Period 1998" (Surabaya: 
ICCF, 1998).
86 John McBeth and Salil Tripathi, "Playing With Ire," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 5,1998, pp. 18- 
19.
87 See, for example, Michael Richardson, "U.S. Commander Sounds Alert on Indonesia Unrest," 
International Herald Tribune, February 7-8,1998, pp. 1 ,4 .
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special envoys to see Suharto, and ordered their embassies to prepare emergency 
evacuation measures for their citizens on Indonesian soil. The IMF, facing a wave of 
criticism for its alleged mishandling of the crisis and mounting prospects of a 
deteriorating situation in Indonesia, began to signal its own recognition of die need to 
reevaluate and perhaps renegotiate the agreement signed in mid-January 1998.
Then, as the March 1998 session of the People's Consultative Assembly opened in 
Jakarta, the appearance of order was rapidly restored. The riots halted abruptly, and 
Suharto and Habibie were unanimously "elected" President and Vice-President, 
respectively, by the tightly controlled, mostly appointed assembly, without a single 
interupsi in the proceedings such as had occurred in 1988 and 1993. A wave of military 
reassignments saw Prabowo promoted to the command of Kostrad, the Army Strategic 
Reserve Command, and awarded the rank of Lieutenant General. Other key military 
rotations left such crucial positions as Army Chief of Staff and Greater Jakarta Regional 
Military Commander in the hands of close Prabowo associates and, in operational 
terms, seemingly weakly counterbalanced by the new Armed Forces Commander and 
Defence Minister, General Wiranto, and his allies in senior staff positions and other 
regional command posts.
In the realm of economic policy, moreover, Suharto likewise appeared to have won 
some decisive victories. Despite much-ballyhooed opposition from many quarters and 
the inauspicious timing of the crisis, he had succeeded in installing his close associate, 
ICMI chief and national high-tech czar Habibie as Vice President. His choices for the 
new Cabinet, moreover, tended to replace technocrats with close family friends and 
allies, like presidential golfing and business partner Mohammad 'Bob' Hasan 
(Suharto's first and only ethnic-Chinese Cabinet minister) as Minister for Trade and 
Industry, daughter Mbak Tutut as Minister for Social Affairs, and her long-rumored 
paramour (Ret.) General Hartono as Minister of Home Affairs. Such choices, especially 
that of Hasan and a Tutut ally as the new Minister of Finance, seemed to guarantee 
that Suharto family interests would not be unduly compromised by IMF-prescribed 
reforms. Meanwhile, by mid-April, Suharto had negotiated a new agreement with the 
IMF, one viewed by some analysts as considerably more "flexible" than the one signed 
almost three months earlier.88 With Habibie as Vice-President, family members and 
cronies in the Cabinet and Army leadership, and a fresh infusion of foreign capital on 
the way, Suharto's diversionary and disruptive tactics in the streets appeared to have 
overcome the challenge of macet in die corridors of state power.
6. May 1998: Macet Total
Yet such diversions and disruptions in the streets only delayed and deepened the 
process of macet total. The attacks on Sofyan Wanandi and CSIS, and on "hoarders and 
speculators" more broadly, could not but contribute to the circumstances which kept 
local and foreign businessmen alike from making new investments and other long- 
overdue decisions. The dynamics set in motion by these measures, moreover, 
including the riots, likewise further weakened the stability and value of the rupiah in
88 See, for example, John McBeth, "The Twilight Zone," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 16,1998, pp. 18-
20.
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January and February, increasing the already enormous and unsustainable levels of 
foreign debt owed by local companies and the Indonesian government itself. Thus the 
new agreement signed with the IMF in mid-April 1998, while supposedly more 
"flexible" than the mid-January deal, was based on much more pessimistic forecasts: 
higher debt levels, higher inflation, and negative economic growth (-4 percent) for the 
year rather than stagnation. The impact of these dramatically downward trends was 
now all too evident in rising unemployment, costs of living, scarcities, and hardships 
for millions of Indonesians. IMF disbursement of funds, moreover, was now 
conditional on monthly assessments of Indonesian progress on economic "reform."89 
No end to kemacetan kredit was in sight.
Meanwhile, the adventurist anti-"Chinese" scapegoating in January-February and 
die increasingly nepotistic personnel and policy decisions in March-April had begun to 
exacerbate the threat of impending kemacetan politik. The rapid ascendancy and 
multifarious activities of Lt. Gen. Prabowo and his allies had embittered avowedly 
more "professional" officers in the military establishment and rallied them around die 
respected new Armed Forces Commander and Defense Minister, General Wiranto, 
who had maintained a stoic, melancholy public silence in the preceding months, 
punctuated by his attack on the anti-"Chinese" campaign as "garbage."90 The dismissal 
of regime "technocrats" like Soedrajad Djiwandono and Mar'ie Muhammad and their 
replacement with more pliable Suharto family flunkies had likewise dismayed many in 
PSI-ish, CSIS, and HMI circles and the chattering classes more broadly. Even ICMI 
activists were said to be bitterly disappointed that their own (well-publicized) wish-list 
of Cabinet ministers had mostiy been scotched by the appointment of Mbak Tutut's 
favorites in March. The onset of kemacetan kredit had only exacerbated the problems— 
and accelerated the process—of kemacetan politik at the very hub of the regime.
With Sofyan Wanandi and the CSIS network on the defensive, it was now the turn 
of the old PSI jaringan to mobilize urban middle-class sentiment against the regime. In 
March, women from Universitas Indonesia (UI) and other 61ite circles, led by famed 
astronomer Professor Karlina Leksono, formed a group called "Suara Ibu Peduli" 
(Voice of Concerned Mothers) and protested outside government offices against the 
rising price of milk and other failings of the regime.91 More impressive, perhaps, was 
the former Environment Minister Emil Salim's self-proclaimed vice-presidential 
candidacy, the only open challenge to Habibie. While Salim's candidacy failed to 
stimulate an interupsi in the MPR in March, it did win vocal support from such PSI 
luminaries and fellow former cabinet ministers as Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, 
Mohammad Sadli, and Selo Soemardjan, as well as respected Islamic scholar 
Nurcholish M adjid.92 Knowledgeable observers suggested that Salim 's vice- 
presidential bid enjoyed quiet sympathy in the upper ranks of the military
89 International Monetary Fund, "Indonesia - Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial 
Policies," April 10,1998.
90 "Jangan Sebarkan Sentimen SARA," Kompas, February 10,1998, p. 1; "KSAD Jenderal TNI Wiranto: 
Hasutan Pihak Tertentu Jadi Pemicu Kerusuhan," Republika, February 16,1998, p. 1.
91 "Karlina Leksono: 'Kita Sudah Terlalu Lama Diam'," D & R ,  March 14,1998, pp. 34-37.
92See"SebuahIkhtiar diTengahKem ustahilan,"D & R , February28,1998 ,p .2 0 ;and "EmilSalim: 'Ini 
Pertarungan Antar-Ide'," D & R ,  February 28,1998, pp. 21-23.
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establishment (where the PSI had long enjoyed influence) and broad support in 
middle-class circles.
Indeed, March and April 1998 saw the emergence and spread of anti-government 
student protests at college campuses in many parts of the archipelago, including the 
£lite universities which long served as nodal points in recruitment for and 
reproduction of the New Order. By the end of April, moreover, growing evidence 
suggested that the students' demands for "Reformasi" now enjoyed solid legitimacy 
and support, both within the regime and among key constituencies in Indonesian 
society at large.93 PSI-ish university lecturers, deans, and rectors soon began to appear 
and speak out at campus rallies, and luminaries like Emil Salim and Selo Soemardjan 
voiced their support on such occasions and in newspaper columns.94 Retired generals 
soon joined their ranks.
Beyond these circles, moreover, elements of the emerging "modernist" Moslem 
jaringan also began to mobilize against the regime. Muhammadiyah leader (and UGM 
professor) Dr. Amien Rais had emerged as a vocal critic of Suharto in mid-1997, 
distanced himself from ICMI and, in the face of the anti-"Chinese" campaign of 
January-February 1998, adopted a strong stance against the government and its narrow 
sectarianism. By late April, he emerged at the forefront of the "Reformasi" campaign 
and enjoyed the support of a broad range of HMI, NU-linked, Catholic, and other 
student groups at university campuses around the country.95
In the face of student and jaringan mobilization, moreover, evidence of internal 
strain and discord within the regime soon began to surface. A few top government 
officials spoke darkly of vague conspiracies behind the student protests, while more 
and more figures in the Cabinet and the Parliament embraced the vague notion of 
"Reformasi" and the process of public "dialogue" with student leaders. In the military 
establishment, for example, Army Chief of Staff General Soebagyo, a pliant Prabowo 
ally, issued stem warnings, dismissive comments, and thinly veiled threats to the 
students as protests endured and grew week after week. By contrast, since early 
March, Wiranto-linked regional commanders like East Java's Maj. Gen. Djadja 
Suparman had proved much more accommodating, and by early May General Wiranto 
himself assumed a lead role in the "dialogue" with some student leaders.96 A similar 
split could be discerned in the diverging responses to news that student activists had 
been abducted and allegations that Armed Forces personnel were responsible. Even as 
rumors linking the abductions to Lt. Gen. Prabowo and his allies began to circulate in 
Jakarta, Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto categorically denied official
93 See "1998: The Nationwide Student Protest Movement and the Opening to Democratic Reform," in 
Human Rights W atch/Asia, Academic Freedom in Indonesia: Dismantling Soeharto-Era Barriers (New York: 
Human Rights W atch/Asia, 1998).
94 See, for example, "Prof. Dr. Ichlasul Amal M.A.: 'Mahasiswa-lah yang Sekarang Punya Pow er...'," D & 
R, April 4,1998, pp. 20-21.
95 "A gar Menjadi people Power?," D & R ,  May 2,1998, pp. 67-68; "Membangun Basis Perjuangan Rakyat," 
D & R ,  May 2,1998, pp. 69-70; "'Intifadah Campus M ehtas'," D & R ,  Mei 2,1998, p. 71.
96 "Dialog Sebagai Salah Satu Cara," D & R ,  April 25,1998, pp. 48-49.
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military involvement, condemned whatever "rogue elements" (oknum) had committed 
such misdeeds, and ordered an immediate investigation into the matter.97
It was in the context of these broadening popular protests and deepening regime 
divisions that the government announced its drastic reduction of fuel prices on the 
evening of Monday, May 4.98 Doubtlessly designed, and perfectly timed, to force IMF 
approval and disbursement of funds despite misgivings about the pace and extent of 
reform implementation since the signing of the April 10 accord, this move hiked 
gasoline prices by 70 percent, diesel by 60 percent, and kerosene by 25 percent literally 
overnight.99
That evening, as the long lines for fuel and the ensuing traffic jams in the streets of 
Jakarta and Surabaya suggested, macet total was at hand. Student protests swelled and 
spilled into the streets in several major cities, demonstrators stopped traffic for hours 
outside the regional assembly in Surabaya, and Medan erupted in rallies and rioting.100
With President Suharto out of the country to attend an international conference in 
Cairo, and rumors circulating of a cabinet reshuffle (or special MPR session) on his 
return, macet clogged the streets. Student protests continued to grow, and 
confrontations with police and military authorities became more frequent and more 
heated. The time for a major traffic diversion and street-clearing operation had arrived. 
In the late afternoon of May 12, after hours of protests in and around Jakarta's elite 
Trisakti University, security forces opened fire and shot dead six students, wounding 
many more.101 The killings, suspected to be the premeditated handiwork of military 
elements led by Lt. Gen. Prabowo, generated widespread public outrage.102 On May 
13, thousands joined a burial ceremony for the slain students, bringing crowds to the 
streets. Scattered rioting and looting ensued in several parts of Jakarta and other cities, 
most notably Solo,103 continued and spread on May 14, and finally petered out the next 
day.104
97 "Membentuk Tim, Mencari Penculik," Forum Keadilan, May 4,1998; "Mayjen TNI (Pum.) Samsudin: 
'Apa Mungkin Seorang Jenderal Bisa Melakukan Perbuatan Itu?," Forum Keadilan, May 4,1998.
98 "Sudah Jatuh, Tertimpa Tangga Pula," D & R ,  May 4,1998.
99 See 'IM F Executive Board Completes First Review of Indonesia's Economic Program ," International 
Monetary Fund News Brief No. 98/11, May 4,1998; and "International Monetary Fund Press Briefing on 
First Review of Indonesia's Economic Program by Stanley Fischer and Hubert Neiss," May 4,1998.
100 See: "Perdk Bara Seantero Nusantara," Forum Keadilan, June 1,1998, pp. 18-20.
101 See: "Di Ujung Aksi Damai," Forum Keadilan, June 1,1998, pp. 10-16.
102 See, for example, "'Si Pelaku Bisa Diketahui Dari Komandanna'," Forum Keadilan, June 1,1998, pp. 74- 
78; "M isteri, Keanehan, Campur Aduk Dalam Trisakti Berdarah," Gatra, June 13,1998; "Sidang 
Penembakan Mahasiswa Trisakti: Keberadaan Pasukan Lain Dipertanyakan," Kompas, June 16,1998; 
"Danpomdam Jaya, Kolonel Hendardji: 'Ada Pihak yang Mau Menututup-nutupi Kasus Ini'," Forum 
Keadilan, June 16,1998; "Sidang Penembakan Mahasiswa Trisakti: Perintah Tembak Hanya Ada pada 
Pangdam," Kompas, June 17,1998; and "Sidang Kasus Trisakti: Ada Tembakan dari Arah Citraland," 
Kompas, June 25, 1998.
103 Anggit Noegroho and Bambang Harsri Irawan, Rekaman Lensa Peristiwa Mei 1998 Di Solo (Solo: Aksara 
Solopos, 1998).
104 See, for example, "Jakarta Dilanda Kerusuhan Massa," Kompas, May 14,1998, p. 1; "Perusuh 
Menjarah," Kompas, May 15,1998, p. 1; and "Kerusuhan Makin Hebat: 7 Tewas, ratusan mobil dibakar, 
toko2 hancur," Pos Kota, May 15,1998, p. 1.
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The riots were unprecedented in their scope, violence, and impact. Subsequent 
reports estimated that more than one thousand people had lost their lives, many others 
had suffered beatings, rapes, and other indignities, and countless shops, homes, and 
other forms of private property had been lost to burning, looting, and wreckage.105 
While many of those who died were protesters or looters killed by security forces 
and/or trapped inside burning buildings, it was the ethnic-Chinese Jakarta residents 
who were targeted for violent abuse at the hands of the rioters. Ethnic-Chinese were 
victimized in countless incidents, most notably the raping of more than one hundred 
women in various parts of Jakarta—acts of violence and brutality unseen in previous 
riots.106 Fearful for their lives, some 150,000 residents (mostly ethnic-Chinese 
Indonesians and Western expatriates) fled the country, mostly by airplane to nearby 
Singapore or Hong Kong.107
Like the shootings at Trisakti University on May 12, the riots in Jakarta on May 13- 
15 bore traces of Prabowo's handiwork. Numerous eyewitness accounts sketched a 
pattern of instigation and coordination by groups of men who initiated the rioting and 
carried out the rapes, described in terms that suggested preman as well as military 
troops in mufti.108 As noted elsewhere in this issue, other evidence linked shady 
figures like Anton Medan and the anti-Chinese activist Ki Gendeng Pamungkas to 
rioting in certain areas of Jakarta.109 Suspicions about the Trisakti shootings and 
security forces' behavior during the riots first focussed on Jakarta Regional 
Commander Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and the Jakarta police chief, Maj. Gen. Pol. 
Hamami Nata, but subsequent revelations by a member of Special Forces (Kopassus) 
were later to prove far more sensational.110
According to this informant, troops from Kopassus, Kostrad, and Kodam Jaya (the 
Greater Jakarta Regional Command) had been assembled as early as March 1998 and 
readied for undercover operations by Prabowo and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. Together with 
Jakarta-based preman and several hundred civilian assets brought in from as far afield 
as East Timor and Irian Jaya, these forces were then mobilized on May 12 and assigned 
targets for "riot" activities, including rapes of ethnic-Chinese women. The military 
operation, under the rubric of a "Gerakan 12 Mei Orde Baru" (May 12 New Order 
Movement), was apparently intended to disrupt and discredit the popular protests 
against the regime, justify a harsh military crackdown in Jakarta, and precipitate both
105 See Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan, Sujud di Hadapan Korban: Tragedi Jakarta Mei 1998 (Jakarta: 
Divisi Data Tim Relawan, 1998).
106 See Tim Pemburu Fakta, Puncak Kebiadaban Batigsa: Pemerkosaan Etrtik Tumghoa 13-14 Mei '98 (Jakarta: 
Yayasan Karyawan Matra, 1998); and Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan, "Dokumentasi Awal No. 3: 
Perkosaan Massal dalam Rentetan Kerusuhan," Jakarta, July 13,1998.
107 "Over 150,000 flee abroad during riots: Ministry," Jakarta Post, June 9,1998, p. 2.
108 Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan, "Dokumentasi Awal No. 1: Pola Kerusuhan di Jakarta dan 
Sekitamya," (mimeo) Jakarta, June 9,1998; Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan, "Dokumentasi Awal No. 2: 
Status Penjarahan dalam Kerusuhan," (mimeo), Jakarta, June 9,1998.
109 See, for example, "Ketika Itu Saya di Australia," Tajuk, September 3,1998, pp. 20-21.
110 See also "Laporan Akhir Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta Peristiwa Tanggal 13-15 Mei 1998," (mimeo), 
Jakarta, October 23,1998.
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the immediate dismissal of Wiranto and the elevation of Prabowo and his allies to the 
top command posts in the Armed Forces.111
If such a plot indeed achieved ample tactical success, the consequences of these 
"riots" spelled strategic defeat. On May 15, the President returned home early from 
Cairo, security forces began to reassert "law and order" on the streets of Jakarta, and 
the government restored the fuel subsidies.112 Yet with a Cabinet reshuffle reportedly 
imminent, a final round of rotations at the highest echelons of New Order power was 
in the offing, albeit not the one foreseen by Prabowo or President Suharto.113
Indeed, the lingering horrors of macet in the streets a few days earlier combined 
with fearful anticipations of imminent and irrevocable mutasi in the civilian and 
military hierarchies to undermine internal regime solidity in the face of continuing 
protests and mounting calls for Suharto to step down. In the wake of the riots, 
prominent figues representing the full spectrum of key £lite jaringan—including Adi 
Sasono, the Secretary General of ICMI—had joined opposition leader Amien Rais in a 
fifty-member Majelis Amanat Rakyat (MAR or Assembly of the People's Mandate) and 
called for Suharto's resignation.114 Against this backdrop, rising fears of displacement 
in the imminent reshuffle and contingency plans for a possible Special Session (Sidang 
Istimewa) of the MPR soon precipitated the withdrawal of support for Suharto from 
within even the innermost circuitries of the regime. If, as many feared, Mbak Tutut 
would soon assume the stewardship of Golkar and Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto the 
command of the Armed Forces, the moment for a preemptive strike had arrived.
First to defect were civilian elements loosely affiliated with Habibie, ICMI, and, 
through this jaringan, the HMI students and Muhammadiyah leaders on the streets. On 
May 18, the fraction heads of the DPR, including current Golkar chief and DPR speaker 
Harmoko and Armed Forces fraction leader Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, both Habibie 
allies, publicly called on the President to resign, thus claiming the hitherto rubber- 
stamp parliament as a new locus of authority and the vice-president as legal 
successor.115 Two days later, with thousands of student protesters still occupying the 
Parliament grounds, Economic Coordinating Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita and 
thirteen other cabinet members submitted their resignations. Like their counterparts in 
the DPR, many of these ministers enjoyed a close association or tactical alliance with 
Vice-President Habibie and shared a common distaste for the now ascendant Mbak 
Tutut and her minions in Golkar, the cabinet, and the parliament.
Meanwhile, in the military establishment a set of counter-moves and a process of 
internal consolidation appear to have proceeded in response to the emerging disarray 
and defections in civilian circles. Rumors in early May had suggested growing support
111 See "Saksi Saksi Setelah 100 H ari," Tajuk, September 3,1998, pp. 16-19; and "TGPF Temukan Indikasi 
Kopassus Terlibat Kerusuhan," SiaR, September 30,1998.
112 See, for example, "Menhamkam/Pangab: Situasi Jakarta Sudah Normal, Kompas, May 17,1998, p. 1; 
and "Merevisi Dua Keppres Berumur Sebelas H ari," Forum Keadilan, June 1,1998, pp. 80-85.
113 "Presiden Segera 'Reshuffle' Kabinet," Kompas, May 17,1998, p. 1.
114 'T ara Tokoh Bentuk Majelis Amanat Rakyat," Kompas, May 15,1998, pp. 1 ,7 .
115 "Pimpinan DPR: Sebaiknya Pak Harto Mundur," Kompas, May 19,1998, p. 1; "Pimpinan DPR: Demi 
Persatuan, Presiden Sebaiknya Mundur," Republika, May 19,1998, p. 1; "Presiden Diminta Mundur,"
Media Indonesia, May 19,1998, p. 1.
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in top military circles for a cabinet reshuffle or, if necessary, a special session of the 
MPR, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol) Lt. 
Gen. Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, a close Wiranto ally, had initiated consultations 
with (mostly PSI-ish) civilians about a package of political reforms. After the Jakarta 
"riots" and the DPR chiefs' defections, moreover, a series of meetings among the top 
military brass reportedly led to an emerging consensus in support of the immediate 
convening of a Dewari Refbrmasi (Reform Council) and the holding of new elections 
within a matter of months.116 It was perhaps with this plan in mind that General 
Wiranto publicly rejected parliamentary leaders' May 18 resolution calling for 
Suharto's immediate resignation and Habibie's assumption of presidential powers.
As the Armed Forces leadership closed ranks behind this political initiative, Lt. 
Gen. Prabowo Subianto and his allies found themselves outmaneuvered if not quite 
outgunned. Some reports claim that Prabowo still stood as one of his father-in-law's 
few remaining avowed defenders in the top Armed Forces brass, while other evidence 
suggests he supported the pro-Habibie maneuvers at the DPR and in the Cabinet, but 
in the end his stance did not prove decisive. Prabowo and his allies had assumed 
command over thousands of Kostrad, Kopassus, and Kodam Jaya troops in Jakarta but 
did not enjoy broad support within the military leadership. Instead, widely shared 
resentments and fears of Prabowo, abiding respect for the formal military command 
hierarchy, as well as crosscutting horizontal and vertical ties among officers appear to 
have offset his influence and solidified Wiranto's position among the colonels and 
generals, effectively preempting a coup.
It was thus through an orderly, surgical removal of Suharto that the institutional 
logic of military mutasi and the pressures of £lite civilian jaringan finally flushed out 
the congestion at the heart of the regime. DPR leaders and opposition protesters had 
rejected Suharto's promise of new elections, fourteen cabinet seats were now empty, 
and no credible Dewan Refbrmasi was in sight, but with Suharto's resignation and 
Habibie's assumption of the presidency on May 21, kemacetan politik essentially 
subsided. Subsequent weeks saw the transfer of Prabowo and his allies from the key 
Kostrad, Kopassus, and Kodam Jaya commands in Jakarta, the process leading to his 
official discharge, and Gen. Wiranto's belated assertion of effective command over the 
Armed Forces. Meanwhile, in die Cabinet, Golkar, the DPR, and various state agencies, 
Habibie began to purge close Suharto family minions and to install members of his 
own, ICMI-based, jaringan. At last, the single most enduring obstacle to sirkulasi and 
the impending threat of m acet had been removed, and, staged diversions and 
disruptions aside, it had happened in a surprisingly orderly and fluid fashion.117
116 Keith B. Richburg, "Seven Days That Toppled a Titan: Back-Room Intrigue Led to Suharto's Fall," 
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117 For summaries of these crucial days, see, "Detik-Detik Menjelang Pak Harto Berhenti," Forum Keadilan, 
June 17,1998; "Detik-detik Soeharto Berhenti Versi Habibie," Kompas, June 7,1998; and S. Sinansari edp, 
Kronologi Situasi Penggulingan Soeharto" Reportase Jumalistik 72 Jam Yang Menegangkan (Jakarta: Mizan 
Pustaka, 1998).
192 John T. Sidel
7. Condusions
Months after the events of May 1998, neither the full inside story nor the broad 
outlines of their long-term consequences can yet be easily discerned, much as was the 
case in the years in Indonesia after the upheaval of late 1965. Nonetheless, as the 
preliminary analysis above suggests, some tentative condusions can already be drawn, 
sketched against the backdrop of abundant academic research and journalistic 
reporting on the New Order regime and its demise.
First of all, both the strikingly orderly and fluid process and the unexpected 
immediate outcome of Suharto's downfall in May 1998 were dedsively shaped by 
underlying institutional logics and sodological trends which crystallized under the 
New Order. In particular, the steady rotation and retirement of military officers and 
their recirculation through the civilian corridors of the regime inevitably ran up against 
the political congestion created by the personal accumulation and entrenchment of 
Suharto, his family, and his close cronies. Meanwhile, the core civilian circuitries of the 
regime, long restricted to retired officers, priyayi functionaries, CSIS operatives, and 
PSI-ish jaringan, were eventually opened up to new flows of (typically HMI-bred) 
"modernist" Moslem late-comers coursed through Habibie's empire and ICMI. Both 
the military and the civilian hierarchies operated efficiently as vertical recruitment 
networks so long as sirkulasi continued, but ultimately provided the institutional 
pressures and procedures for Suharto's ouster under conditions of incipient macet. The 
removal of Suharto and his family members from both the military hierarchy and file 
core civilian circuitries of the regime thus relieved some of file mounting pressures of 
macet and released long pent-up flows of circulation into the previously restricted 
innermost corridors of state power.
Secondly, these patterns of steady sirkulasi and impending macet also worked to 
shape Suharto's response to the economic crisis that began to unfold in the final 
months of 1997. If in response to previous crises Suharto had opened up new avenues 
to the circulation that was the life-blood of his regime, by the mid-1990s his 
inclinations dictated otherwise. Indeed, it was the pattern of personal accumulation 
and entrenchment by his family that threatened to clog the arteries of state power and 
the circuitries of the economy, and those forces favoring the easing of sirkulasi were 
viewed with deep hostility and suspicion. Hence Suharto's unwillingness to 
implement successive IMF agreements and his staging of various diversions and 
disruptions instead. In this regard, the anti-"Chinese" campaign, the choice of B. J. 
Habibie as Vice-President, and the "riots" in Jakarta in May carried the false promise of 
alternative routes for circulation (and redistribution) to those leading towards the 
Palace and the President's family.
Thirdly, these patterns of internal regime circulation and management of macet 
prefigured the short-circuiting of Suharto's strategy within the state and the popular 
macet in die streets. Staged disruptions and "riots" since the mid-1990s had sidelined 
those forces least incorporated into New Order £lite circulation and capital 
accumulation but most capable of mass mobilization: Megawati's PDI and her 
supporters among the urban poor; the SBSI and other labor unions; student and NGO 
activists linked with the left-ish PRD; and even the lower-middle-class Moslem 
networks of the Nahdlatul Ulama. These "riots" undermined attempts at popular
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mobilization, pathologized the appearance of "the people" on the streets, and pitted 
the energies of the excluded against the putatively alien "Chinese."
Meanwhile, the regime's creation and cultivation of a new jaringan for Moslem 
incorporation and ascendancy within the circuitries of state power and capital 
accumulation served to stimulate—and legitimate—popular energies that could be 
channeled but never fully contained. Habibie's huge empire and ambitions, and the 
expanding reach of ICMI, ran up against the ceiling imposed by the Suharto family's 
entrenchment in core state circuitries and their enormous private konglom erasi, 
generating disappointment and disillusionment with the regime. Hence the 
prominence of Amien Rais and a network of HMI activists (and prominent alumni) in 
the ranks of the opposition, and the eventual defection of pro-Habibie forces from 
Suharto. On college campuses throughout the country, and in the innermost corridors 
of power, "modernist" Moslems succeeded in identifying their aspirations in broader, 
more public and inclusive terms, in line with the other insurgent jaringan and against 
the narrow interests of the Palace.
Fourthly and finally, the nature of the transition in May 1998 left the broader 
problems of sirkulasi and m acet unresolved. Today, even as the Suharto family's 
konglomerasi and patronage networks within the state are being dismantled, General 
Wiranto has remained as both Defense Minister and Armed Forces Commander, and 
the military establishment has retained many of its considerable powers over 
personnel and policy within the Indonesian state. Meanwhile, members of Habibie's 
ICMI-based jaringan have begun to entrench themselves in the civilian circuitries of the 
regime—Golkar, the DPR, the Cabinet, and key state milking cows. An uneasy 
duumvirate based on these two hierarchies has now survived for several months, 
brokered by cabinet ministers closely linked to Habibie and ICMI circles but also 
enjoying residual influence in the military.
Against such tendencies towards the crystallization and entrenchment of a new 
authoritarian regime stands a broad array of social forces now mobilizing for elections 
in 1999. The strongest oppositional forces, perhaps unsurprisingly, are to be found 
among those public figures whose prominence and power emanates not from their 
inclusion in the circuitries of state power but from a popular base. Such figures as 
Megawati Soekamoputri and Gus Dur, for example, can claim not only direct lineages 
to two major political parties of the pre-Suharto era, but a deeper affinity for dynasty 
building than for jaringan links, for private accumulation instead of circulation within 
the state. Firmly rooted both in the popular imagination and in enduring local 
oligarchies, these figures may represent the promise—and the limitations—of the 
liberal democratic politics to come.
Yet, as recent riots and other disruptions have suggested, the patterns of £lite 
circulation and macet management which evolved in the course of the New Order may 
well have survived the passing of Suharto from the scene. Popular pressures for—and 
official promises of—"Refbrmasi" notwithstanding, the Armed Forces leadership has 
retained considerable prerogatives in politics and is unlikely to surrender its privileged 
position in state and society overnight. Meanwhile, the configuration of political 
alliances within the broad realm of "modernist" Moslem jaringan has remained in 
considerable flux, with Amien Rais and many of his followers in Muhammadiyah now 
committed to a broadly inclusive, PSI-ish party but perhaps still available for a merger
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with more Masjumi-ish groupings and/or incorporation into regime circuitries (even 
Golkar) now more thoroughly, albeit narrowly, "Islamic." After all, for many in such 
jaringan, there remains a broad field of compatability between a heavily £tatiste 
industrial strategy, a dominant- or one-party regime, and a program of social 
advancement for Moslems.
Beyond such issues of 61ite circulation lurks a set of larger questions about the 
place of capital in a post-Suharto Indonesia. Even after many years of rapid 
industrialization and economic growth under the New Order, the Indonesian capitalist 
class remained politically servile, compromised, and vulnerable, due to the 
problematic "alien" status of "Chinese" businessmen and the reliance on state largesse 
of their typically well-connected pribumi ("indigenous") competitors. Thus, as students 
and prominent intellectuals rallied behind "Reformasi" in the streets and military 
officers and civilian politicians plotted in the corridors of power in early-mid May 
1998, most Indonesian businessmen remained on the sidelines, whether in virtual 
hiding in Jakarta or in hotels in Hong Kong or Singapore.
In these early months of the post-Suharto era, moreover, the political position of 
capital in Indonesia remains a pivotal if as yet unanswerable question. The 1999 
elections, after all, may offer an unprecedented opportunity for business "investment" 
in opposition politicians and the institutions of liberal democracy, or, alternatively, yet 
another shakedown by Golkar and its Army backers. If Barrington Moore, Jr. was 
right, and if the Southeast Asian examples of Thailand and the Philippines are any 
guide, a politically "vigorous and independent"—if not ethnically assimilated— 
capitalist class will be necessary for a stable liberal democracy. Yet the hopes and 
pressures for " Demokrasi" in Indonesia today push for political change far beyond the 
crass money politics and local bossism found in such nearby post-authoritarian 
democracies in the region. Under the nervous but still vigilant gaze of the policemen, 
traffic is flowing again on the streets but there are new forms of macet still to come.
